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AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY 
CLIMATE IN A HIGHLY REGULATED ENVIRONMENT 
 
Security professionals, particularly those working in the field of nuclear security, 
have become increasingly interested in organizational characteristics which might 
influence an organization’s security performance.  However, empirical research on such 
constructs has been limited.  Therefore, the purpose of this project was to conduct an 
exploratory investigation of the proposed construct of security climate.  In light of the 
limited amount of previous work on the topic the study sought to operationalize the 
construct, establish the emergent nature of the construct, and investigate the impact of 
security climate on security performance.   
The participating organization, which operates in the highly regulated nuclear 
environment, provided three years of archival data gathered from multiple divisions 
within the enterprise.  Results indicate that security climate is a multidimensional 
construct comprised of management support for security, co-worker support for security, 
and security policies and procedures.  Evidence also suggests that individuals’ 
perceptions regarding security do become shared among employees within the same unit 
which verifies the emergent nature of security climate.  Furthermore, security climate 
varied across units and these differences were correlated to division security exposure.  
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However, the hypothesized relationship between security climate and security 
performance, after controlling for security exposure, could not be accurately assessed due 
to the presence of reciprocal suppression among the security climate and security 
exposure variables.  Nonetheless, zero order correlations did provide some evidence of a 
relationship between security climate and two separate measures of security performance 
(event frequency and event severity), although the results were not in the anticipated 
direction.  Implications of the study, as well as directions for future research, are 
discussed. 
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Department of Psychology 
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Fall 2010 
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An Exploratory Investigation of Organizational Security Climate in a Highly 
Regulated Environment 
Security – which can be defined as the act of “safeguarding (the interests of) a 
state, organization, person, etc., against danger” (Simpson & Weiner, 1989) – is an 
extremely broad concept given its applicability at so many levels of society.  As the 
definition implies, entities from the individual to the nation state – and perhaps even the 
global community – are faced with potentially harmful security threats.  Organizations 
are no exception.  Virtually every organization must confront a variety of threats that can 
have dire consequences for the organization, its members, and the broader society.  
Consider the following examples: 
 Studies suggest that 75% of employees steal from their employer at least once (Case, 
2000; McGurn, 1988) and almost 95% of U.S. business have reported experiencing 
some theft or fraud (Case, 2000).  And while some businesses in industries such as 
Retail may factor some employee theft into the “cost” of doing business, the possibly 
severe consequences of such acts become clear when one considers that an estimated 
20% (Coffin, 2003) to 30% (Morgenstern, 1977) of U.S. business failures come as a 
direct result of employee theft and dishonesty.   
 Workplace violence is a remarkably common problem faced by many organizations.  
So common, in fact, that one study found nearly 25% of organizations surveyed 
reported some type of physical attack against an on-the-job employee during the 
course of a three year period (Rigdon, 1994).  Although media attention typically 
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focuses on the tragic cases of workplace violence that result in fatalities, even non-
fatal (but more frequent) incidents can have grave impacts on an organization and its 
employees.   
 The widespread adoption of information technology has introduced organizations to a 
number of potential security threats including electronic espionage, denial of service 
attacks, and even identity theft.  A variety of recent media reports highlight such 
problems and underscore the need to protect both computer networks (e.g., McGregor 
& Sevastopulo, 2007; Marquand & Arnoldy, 2007) as well as information stored on 
electronic media (e.g., Lee, 2006; Seper, 2007).  As organizations continue to expand 
their reliance on information technology, the importance of computer security will 
continue to grow.  
Theft, violence, and computer hacking are just three examples from a long list of 
security threats which confront organizations.  In light of the potentially severe impacts 
any one of these threats can create, organizations are increasingly viewing strong security 
as an operational necessity that is vital to their long term interests.  This is particularly 
true in Western industrialized countries such as the United States.  In fact, a report 
published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Hobijn & Sager, 2007) found that 
total government and private sector expenditures designated for homeland security
1
 rose 
from $56 billion in 2001 to almost $100 billion in 2005. 
Much of this recent interest and investment has been focused on the development 
of security hardware and software which utilizes advanced technology such as global 
                                                   
 
1
 Hobijn and Sager used criteria from the Office of Management and Budget to determine 
government spending and define private sector expenditures in terms of spending on protective services 
(i.e. guards) and electronic equipment (e.g., cameras, etc.).  The authors acknowledge some problems with 
theses definitions, but they also rightly point out how difficult it is to accurately segment and quantify the 
security industry.   
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positioning systems, radio frequency identification tags, sophisticated data encryption 
algorithms, and computer software and hardware which monitors computer networks for 
indicators of possible intrusion.  Researchers and academicians in fields such as security 
engineering, cryptography, and computer security have contributed to great advances in 
such technology and hardware.  And while this type of technology can have limitations 
and vulnerabilities (e.g., Warner & Johnston, 2002; Warner & Johnston, 2006), the 
proper application of these devices can significantly inprove security.  But research (e.g., 
Pond, 2002) suggests that many security challenges have contributing factors related to 
human and organizational characteristics, and the deployment of high tech equipment 
does not always address these root causes.  Therefore, in addition to the work of those in 
fields like security engineering and cryptography, the study of security can also be 
advanced by examining organizational and individual factors which may affect security 
practices, security compliance, and/or security behaviors.  In the present study, I will 
examine the characteristics of one organizational variable, security climate, and 
investigate the variable’s usefulness as a predictor of security performance.   
Anyone attempting to study security climate is faced with three major challenges. 
First, there are many different types of workplace security incidents (e.g., theft, sabotage, 
violence, information leaking, etc.), yet there does not seem to be a single framework for 
organizing them. Second, the concept of workplace security needs to be distinguished 
from other potentially similar constructs such as workplace safety as well as 
counterproductive workplace behaviors (CWBs, Spector, 1975) and other related terms 
(deviant workplace behaviors, Robinson, & Bennett, 1995; workplace violence or 
workplace aggression, Neuman, & Baron, 1998).  Finally, the concept of security climate 
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has gone largely unexplored and therefore must be operationalized in a meaningful way.  
In the following sections, an attempt will be made to begin to address these challenges. 
A Framework for Understanding Workplace Security Incidents 
Based upon a review of one organization’s internal security incident reports as 
well as literature that examines various proposed taxonomies of workplace aggression 
(Snyder, Chen, Grubb, Roberts, Sauter, & Swanson, 2004), a basic framework for 
organizing and categorizing workplace security incidents is suggested here.  Within this 
framework, security incidents are categorized based on three primary dimensions - 
perpetrator, target, and intention.  First, security threats are the result of individuals’ 
violation (for whatever reasons or motivations) of security rules.  These people can be 
affiliated with organizations or not.  In other words, workplace security incidents (e.g., 
information leaking) can be caused by organizational insiders, organizational outsiders, 
or a combination of the two.     
The second dimension that can be used for categorizing security incidents is based 
on the nature of the asset being threatened.  While there may be other ways to categorize 
assets (for example, one common distinction among security professionals is between 
physical assets vs. computer/electronic assets), this framework  does so based on a 
continuum from organizational assets to individual assets.  Obviously an organization is 
motivated to protect the assets it owns from threats like theft or vandalism, but it should 
also be concerned by threats to individual employees such as theft of personal property or 
workplace violence. 
The third dimension for categorizing security incidents at work is the intent of the 
perpetrator.  In some cases, security incidents (such as espionage, sabotage, and 
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physically or verbally attacking co-workers) occur as the result of intentional actions on 
the part of the perpetrator.  However, in some circumstances, security incidents occur 
unintentionally due to negligence or the lack of awareness.  For instance, when 
employees inadvertently transmit sensitive organizational information to unauthorized 
individuals or accidentally leave secure entryways unlocked and unprotected.  Although 
incidents of this type are likely to threaten organizational assets, there is no malicious 
intention to harm the organization.  
Workplace Security, Counterproductive Workplace Behaviors, and Workplace Safety 
While the above framework may be useful for categorizing various types of 
security incidents, it is particularly relevant to this study because it provides information 
which may help to identify similarities and differences between security and two other 
related constructs: counterproductive workplace behavior (CWBs) and workplace safety.  
These two constructs are noteworthy because even though it will be argued that both are 
distinct from security, both are related to – and in some cases overlap with – the security 
construct.       
The CWB construct, which was initially proposed by Spector (1975), has been 
defined as “any intentional behavior on the part of an organization member viewed by the 
organization as contrary to its legitimate interests” (Sackett, 2002, p. 5).  It is a broad 
concept that encompasses perhaps as many as eighty-five different types of behaviors 
(Gruys, 1999).  From an organization’s perspective, CWBs include aggression, hostility, 
sabotage, theft, violence, and withholding of output.  CWBs can be expressed overtly or 
covertly as well as physically or verbally.  Over the years, researchers have proposed and 
defined a number of constructs (including antisocial workplace behavior, deviance, 
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bullying, and organizational aggression) which, despite some minor distinctions, tend to 
be very closely related to the CWB construct.  In fact, the definitions for each of these 
terms share two common elements.  First of all, these behaviors are committed by 
perpetrators with the intention to negatively impact other employees or their employers.  
Second, these behaviors may be committed for a variety of different reasons which 
suggests that the concept is not a unitary one (Spector, Fox, Penney, Bruursema, Goh, & 
Kessler, 2006).   
Considering the broad nature of the CWB construct, one might argue that 
workplace security is merely a subset of the CWB construct.  However, this study does 
not conceptualize CWBs and security as synonymous concepts.  First, research on CWBs 
has exclusively focused on the actions of organizational members but security threats can 
be the result of organizational insiders as well as outsiders and security regulations are 
often developed with the specific goal of deterring both categories of perpetrator.  
Furthermore, CWBs have traditionally been defined in a way that includes intentional 
acts but excludes any unintentional behaviors.  While many security incidents  are the 
result of a malicious perpetrator acting with intent, the occurrence of a security event is 
often the result of a number of contributing factors which could include unintentional acts 
(e.g., errors) on the part of an employee which creates a vulnerability that an adversary 
could exploit.     
Another construct similar to workplace security is workplace safety.  In some 
societies there is very little distinction between safety and security.  An example of such a 
culture is Russia, where the similarity between the two constructs is reflected 
linguistically by the fact that the same word is used to represent both concepts 
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(Khripunov, 2005).  And while the English language does have separate words for the 
two concepts, many English language thesauri list safety and security as synonyms 
(Kipfer, 2007).  However, the relationship between the two concepts is more than just a 
matter of linguistics.  For example, programs that support either safety or security tend to 
be largely compliance-based (i.e. rules driven).  In addition, the causes of both safety and 
security events can often be traced back to multiple contributing factors.   
To demonstrate the similarity between safety and security, consider an instance of 
workplace violence as an example.  Because workplace violence can result in physical 
and emotional harm to an employee, clearly such events present safety concerns for an 
organization.  However, organizational efforts to prevent such events, as well as respond 
to them when they are occurring, are likely to fall within the responsibilities of the 
organization’s security professionals.  The fact that a single event can span both the 
safety and security fields illustrates the close relationship between the two constructs.  
Nonetheless, workplace safety is conceptually different from workplace security 
on several grounds.  First, workplace safety research and legislation (e.g., Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, 1970) has mainly focused on establishing safe and healthy 
working conditions for employees by reducing illness as well as fatal and non-fatal 
injuries resulting from inadequate working conductions.  In other words, safety threats 
such as hazard exposures are almost exclusively directed at individual workers.  In 
contrast, the framework for understanding security presented earlier incorporates threats 
to the individual as well as the organization.  Second, threats to workplace safety are not 
typically the result of intentional acts by employees nor caused by a malicious adversary; 
rather, they are often the result of characteristics of the job tasks and working conditions.  
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Security incidents, on the other hand, can be committed intentionally or unintentionally, 
with or without an adversary.  Finally, security officers and safety officers perform 
different tasks with different tools and equipment (O*NET, Department of Labor). 
Despite the differences between security and the constructs of CWBs and safety, 
the similarities which exist may support the notion that results and conclusions from 
research on these other topics may have some applicability to the field of organizational 
security.  For example, Hollinger (1986) found that CWBs such as theft are more 
common among younger employees with less tenure and less commitment to the 
organization, a finding that is clearly relevant to the field of security.  And while much of 
the CWB research tends to focus on individual variables like those in Hollinger’s study, 
Trevino and Youngblood (1990) have suggested that more attention should be paid to 
situational variables.  This suggestion has begun to gain traction in the field of security as 
well.  
The idea of applying the construct of organizational culture, defined as a 
phenomenon based on symbolic meanings that reflect core values and underlying 
ideologies and assumptions (Ostroff, Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003), to the field of security 
has received increased attention in recent years.  This is especially true in the field of 
nuclear security, which is focused on the protection of nuclear assets (such as fissile 
materials, technology, and facilities) used for research, power generation, and military 
purposes.  For instance, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is an 
agency of the United Nations responsible for monitoring nuclear security and safeguards 
programs among member nations, has repeatedly issued statements urging members to 
foster a good nuclear security culture as a supplement to existing efforts to protect 
                                                                                
9 
 
nuclear assets (e.g., IAEA, 2001; IAEA, 2002; IAEA, 2003).  In addition, the presidents 
of the United States and Russia have issued a joint statement that acknowledges the 
importance of nuclear security culture and commits to developing both a greater 
understanding and increased application of the construct (White House, 2005).  But it 
must be acknowledged that the concept of nuclear security culture is still very much in its 
infancy.  To date, the IAEA has not offered any concrete guidance on what nuclear 
security culture really means, how it could be established, or what impact it may have on 
nuclear security efforts.  And despite presidential support, theoretical and empirical 
investigations of the construct have been limited.  Ultimately, though, this high-level 
interest in the topic is encouraging and will likely lead to more extensive research 
attention in the future. 
However, organizational culture is not the only organizational variable with 
potential applicability to security which merits more extensive research attention.  The 
closely related construct of organizational climate – defined as attributes of organizations 
that are reflected by employees’ shared perceptions of organizational policies, practices, 
and procedures about specific organizational focus areas (Reichers & Schneider, 1990; 
Schneider & Snyder, 1975) – may also be a useful addition to the field.  But in contrast to 
organizational culture, the potential for applying organizational climate to the field of 
security (and more specifically nuclear security) has gone largely unaddressed.  In light 
of this void, the purpose of the current study is to begin the process of developing and 
validating the construct of security climate.   




As defined previously, organizational climate has been conceptualized as 
characteristics or attributes of organizations that are reflected by employees’ shared 
perceptions of organizational policies, practices, and procedures about specific 
organizational focus areas (Reichers & Schneider, 1990; Schneider & Snyder, 1975).  
The construct, which has had a long history in the behavioral sciences, has evolved quite 
substantially since its inception.  While a thorough review of this evolution is beyond the 
scope of this study (cf. Reichers & Schneider, 1990), a brief summary will be helpful for 
understanding the development of workplace security climate in the later section.  
The origins of organizational climate can be traced back to the work of Kurt 
Lewin and colleagues starting in the late 1930’s.  Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939), 
introduced the term climate, which they also called atmosphere, in a study of adolescent 
boys at a summer camp.  In the thirty to forty years that followed the work of Lewin et 
al., the study of organizational climate has gained widespread favor.  Initially, 
organizational climate was viewed as a global, almost all-purpose, construct that could be 
used to study a wide array of organizational events.  However, a series of reviews (e.g., 
Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, & Weick, 1970; Payne & Pugh, 1976) have suggested that 
the construct of organizational climate has only a limited impact on any one type of 
organizational outcome.  Specifically, researchers have argued that the general 
conceptualization of organizational climate would not be helpful in predicting or 
influencing specific phenomena such as managerial job performance in organizations 
(Pritchard & Karasick, 1973).  This, in part, led Schneider (1975) to conclude that the 
general concept of organizational climate had become so all-encompassing that it was no 
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longer useful.  Therefore, Schneider suggested that future climate studies should identify 
a specific and focused area of concern, a “climate for” something.  This suggestion has 
been widely accepted and a number of specific climates – such as climate for service 
(Schneider, 1990), climate for safety (Zohar, 1980), climate for creativity (Amabile, 
Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996), and climate for technical updating (Kozlowski 
& Klein, 1987) – have been proposed and studied.  But despite these diverse applications 
of the construct, each of these climate types share the common understanding that climate 
is an organizational characteristic represented by employees’ shared perceptions 
regarding a specific and focused area of organizational concern.  The current study also 
shares this view of climate and therefore will focus on organizational climate for security 
(or workplace security climate), rather than generic organizational climate, in order to 
better understand workplace security.   
Definition and Dimensions of Workplace Security Climate 
By adapting the definition of general organizational climate for use with the 
strategic outcome of security, workplace security climate can be defined as a security 
characteristic of an organization that is manifested in employees’ shared perceptions of 
the organization’s security policies, practices, and procedures.  In this section, the 
dimensional nature of security climate, the phenomenon of security climate emergence 
within organizations, and individual and organizational outcomes associated with security 
climate will be discussed.  
The current study views security climate as a multifaceted construct, a view 
which is aligned with the way most of the previously proposed types of organizational 
climate have been viewed.  Rather than a homogeneous perceptual domain, the construct 
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is comprised of a number of separate dimensions.  These dimensions can be viewed as 
distinct categories of employee perceptions formed in response to sets of security-related 
stimuli that are encountered in the work environment.  As a result, research on security 
climate should explore the possible dimensions that make up the construct.  
Over the years, climate researchers have proposed many climate dimensions 
including structure, reward, risk, warmth, support, standards, conflict, identity, 
democraticness, supportiveness, innovativeness, peer relations, pressure, and so on 
(Ostroff et al., 2003).  However, this process of identifying climate dimensions has 
generally lacked an organized framework for generating these dimensions which has lead 
to inconsistency and confusion in the way different dimensions are labeled, defined, and 
used (Carr, Schmidt, Ford, & DeShon, 2003).  Most, if not all, of the empirical research 
related to climate dimensions relies primarily on factor analytic techniques (Meyer, 1968; 
Schneider & Bartlett, 1968; Schneider & Hall, 1972; Thornton, 1969; Waters, Roach, & 
Batlis, 1974), which has resulted in paring the number of climate dimensions to between 
four and seven.  For example, Waters et al. identified four climate dimensions including 
effective organizational structure, close impersonal supervision, open challenging 
environment, and management and peer support.   
One frequently cited work attempting to organize the dimensions of climate is that 
of Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, and Weick (1970).  Campbell et al. reviewed a small 
sample of climate research from the 1960’s and found that there were four common 
dimensions that appeared in each study.  These dimensions included individual 
autonomy, structure imposed upon the position, reward orientation, and 
consideration/warmth/support.  While interesting, the authors urged caution when trying 
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to draw conclusions from this finding.  Not only were the findings based on a limited 
number of studies (four), but the authors also found a number of examples of proposed 
climate dimensions from one or more of these studies that were not included in the 
others.  Despite these shortcomings, the work of Campbell et al., Waters et al. (1974), as 
well as research on safety climate has helped to lay the groundwork for the development 
of security climate dimensions. 
Management Support 
One dimension worthy of consideration for inclusion as a dimension of security 
climate is the dimension of management support.  As a dimension examined in previous 
climate studies (e.g., Zohar, 1980, 2000, 2002; Hemingway & Smith, 1999; Smith-
Crowe, Burke, & Landis, 2003; Tracey & Tews, 2005; Weyman, Clarke, & Cox, 2003), 
management support has previously been defined as employees’ perceptions of the 
degree to which managers and supervisors support, promote, manage and prioritize the 
importance of various organizational outcomes.  Perceptions of management actions that 
demonstrate commitment to a particular outcome (such as security in the present study) 
are important because they may influence employee’s perceptions of the overall 
importance of that outcome to the organization.  For example, Clarke (1999) found that 
the discrepancy between managers’ espoused values (those that are officially endorsed) 
and managers’ enacted values (those that are put into practice through actual behavior) 
about safety was a driving factor in the development of employee perceptions of a safety 
program. Clarke’s conclusion about the importance of management commitment is 
supported by a number of other safety climate researchers.  At least three studies (Flin, 
Mearns, O’Connor & Bryden, 2000; Ho, 2005; Seo, Torabi, Blair, & Ellis, 2004) have 
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been conducted which explore commonalities among various operationalizations of the 
safety climate construct.  Results from each of these reviews suggest that the most 
commonly used dimension in the field of safety climate is that of management support.  
For example, Flin et al. found that of the eighteen scales of safety climate included in 
their review, 72% contained some measure of management commitment or support for 
safety.  This result was supported by Seo et al. who found that among the sixteen studies 
reviewed nearly two-thirds operationalized management commitment or support as a 
dimension of safety climate.   
One possible explanation for the importance of management support comes from 
social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1958).  Social exchange theory suggests 
that when one party in a social interaction consistently acts in a way that benefits another 
party, the latter party will eventually adjust their own behavior in a way that benefits the 
former.  Hofmann and colleagues (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Hofmann, Morgeson, & 
Gerras, 2003) have suggested a social exchange model as the theoretical mechanism 
underlying the significance of management commitment as a dimension of safety climate.  
According to these authors, when employees perceive strong management commitment 
to safety they return that commitment with safety compliance as part of the social 
exchange.  It is possible that the same type of mechanism underlies the management 
commitment dimension of security climate. 
 Effects of management support or commitment on security behaviors might also 
be explained by role modeling.  Greenberg and Scott (1996) have suggested that at least 
some employee theft may be attributed to the fact that employees mimic behaviors 
modeled by their supervisors or managers.  They argued that when a manager engages in 
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activities such as theft, employees would likely perceive that managers aren’t committed 
to security and therefore it is not important for them to be concerned with it either.  
Although there is a lack of empirical evidence testing the above proposition, such a 
suggestion is supported by assertions from a number other experts on employee theft 
(e.g., Cherrington & Cherrington, 1985; Greenberg, 1997; and Hollinger, 1989).  
 Further evidence for the importance of management support for security comes 
from research suggesting that certain actions of managers convey their commitment to 
security, which in turn influences employees’ security behaviors.  For instance, 
inappropriate security behaviors such as employee theft diminish when managers 
regularly communicate to employees about the importance of security (Carter, 
Holmström, Simpanen, & Melin, 1988).  In addition, it has been suggested that when 
managers conduct regular security audits they are displaying their commitment to 
security, and this practice can lead to a reduction of employee theft behaviors as well as 
raise management’s awareness of the problem (Jones and Terris, 1983).  Finally, a 
limited amount of theoretical work in the field of nuclear security culture also suggests 
that management support for security is an important dimension of security climate.  For 
example, Khripunov, Nikonov, and Katsva (2004) contended that managers “can use 
their positions of power to…encourage new and different assumptions and patterns of 
thinking among their colleagues…” (pp. 45-46).  In fact, these authors state that one of 
the key attributes of top leaders in the nuclear field is a “personal commitment to security 
culture” (p. 47). 
 In light of these research findings, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1a: Perceptions of management support for security is a dimension of security climate. 




 Co-worker support for security (which the study defines as employees’ 
perceptions of the degree to which co-workers and peers support, promote, and prioritize 
the importance of organizational security) is another potentially important dimension of 
security climate.  The idea that co-worker support for security would impact an 
individual’s security behavior is not without merit.  Research has shown that when people 
come together in groups, rules of behavior (often referred to as norms) develop quickly, 
are usually very clear to group members, and can profoundly impact member behavior 
(Tuckman, 1965).   
Additional theoretical support for the importance of co-worker support as a 
dimension of security climate, and the role this dimension might have on an individual’s 
behavior, comes from the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) as well as a 
subsequent refinement in that theory which Ajzen (1985; 1991) has called the theory of 
planned behavior.  Both of these theories propose that an individual’s behavior is 
impacted by social influence in the form of both subjective norms as well as normative 
beliefs.  On the one hand, subjective norms consist of perceptions that a behavior, in this 
case a behavior either supportive of or detrimental to security, is expected by important 
and respected people (such as co-workers) that surround an individual.  On the other 
hand, normative beliefs are an individual’s perceptions about a behavior (again, either 
supportive of or detrimental to security) that are influenced in part by the judgments of 
the significant others that surround the individual (such as co-workers).  Taken together, 
subjective norms and normative beliefs can exert social influence from one’s co-workers.  
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These social influences can then impact an individual’s perceptions, as well as behaviors, 
related to security. 
 Work in the area of CWB’s also seems to suggest that co-work support may be an 
important component of security climate.  A number of studies of employee theft in 
various industrial settings (Horning, 1970; Sieh, 1987) have found that in situations 
where there was no clear guidance from the organization about the taking of company 
property, work groups established their own norms about what was appropriate and 
inappropriate behavior.  However, even in situations where the organization has provided 
clear standards of behavior, group norms often supersede such rules.  For example 
Dabney (1995) studied co-worker norms among nurses working in a hospital setting.  
This study found that even when the hospital had explicit rules against taking any 
medicine from hospital supplies for personal use, nurses had developed their own norms 
which individuals used to rationalize the taking of certain types of drugs such as non-
narcotic pain medicines.  However, these group norms were in line with some hospital 
rules such as strictly forbidding the taking of any narcotic medications.  In fact, group 
norms have not only shown to be more influential than formal organizational rules, but it 
has been suggested that it is only through group norms that formal rules are enforced 
(Hollinger & Clark, 1982). 
 Given this literature, the following research hypothesis is put forth: 
H1b: Perceptions of co-worker support for security is a dimension of security climate. 
Perceptions of Security Policies and Procedures  
 It has been argued that perceptions of an organization’s policies and procedures 
are a key component of climate (Rentsch, 1990).  Zohar (1980) found that, along with 
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management support, employees’ perceptions of safety procedures were an important 
aspect of an organization’s safety climate.  In addition, Coyle, Sleeman, and Adams 
(1995) found that employees’ perceptions of company safety policies accounted for the 
second largest percentage of variance in safety climate among clerical and service 
organizations in Australia.  Similarly, Diaz and Cabrera (1997) found that perceptions of 
organizational policies explained the greatest percentage of variance in safety climate 
among employees working in the airline industry.   
 While limited, research in the field of security also suggests that security policies 
and procedures are often judged by employees in terms of their relevance (are they 
necessary?), their effectiveness (do they actually improve security?), and their user-
friendliness (are they understandable and not overly cumbersome to implement?).  As 
such, Khripunov et al. (2004) suggested that security policies and procedures should be 
up-to-date, succinct, clear, and user-friendly.  
 In light of the central role employees’ perceptions of security policies and 
procedures play in the definition of security climate, the following research hypothesis is 
proposed: 
H1c: Perceptions of security policies and procedures are a dimension of security climate. 
Emergence of Security Climate 
Security climate reflects employees’ shared perceptions about workplace security.  
The formation of climate, which is called climate emergence, occurs when individual 
perceptions become shared at the group level.  Three main theories have been put forth in 
the organizational climate literature to explain the mechanisms driving climate 
emergence.  First, the structrualist perspective (e.g., Payne & Pugh, 1976) suggests that 
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organizational characteristics such as structure or size create a strong situation that leads 
employees to develop similar types of perceptions.  The attraction-selection-attrition 
perspective (e.g., Schneider & Reichers, 1983) suggests that individuals are attracted to 
organizations that seem to match their personality, organizations tend to select 
individuals with personalities that fit with the organization, and when an individual joins 
and organization that is a mismatch for their personality they will ultimately leave 
whether voluntarily or otherwise.  In the end, this process will result in a somewhat 
homogeneous workforce that tends to develop similar types of perceptions.  Finally, the 
socialization perspective (e.g., Ashforth, 1985) suggests that when newcomers are 
socialized into a group, and as group members interact over time, a level of conformity 
develops which leads to consistency in the perceptions that employees develop. 
While each of these theories has seen some research attention, there is still no 
overwhelming empirical support in favor of any of these theories over the others.  But 
despite the lack of a universally accepted explanation for the mechanisms driving the 
emergent process, evidence suggests that organizational climate in the form of shared 
perceptions does emerge within organizations.  For instance, Zohar (1980) administered a 
safety climate survey to a sample of employees from twenty different factories 
representing four industry segments to investigate whether safety climate would emerge 
among the employees within each of these organizations.  His results suggested that 
shared safety perceptions did exist within individual factories. 
Although Zohar studied safety climate by assessing the level of agreement among 
individuals within a single organization, the emergence of organizational climate might 
also occur within distinct units, groups, or departments of a single organization (e.g., 
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Zohar, 2000, 2002).  This is particularly relevant to the current study because the data 
was gathered from a very large organization which is made up of a number of divisions.  
And all of these divisions are distinct from the others in a number of different ways.  
When viewing these differences within the context of the three theories of climate 
emergence, investigating security climate at the division level may be merited.  For 
example, differences in size, work environments (laboratories vs. offices), and type of 
work (business services vs. R&D) might be important in light of the structrualist 
perspective.  The attraction-selection-attrition perspective might be important in light of 
the fact that many R&D divisions focus on a specific technical field (e.g., physics, 
chemistry, biology) so many employees within the same division hail from the same 
academic traditions.  Finally, the socialization perspective might be relevant because the 
organization encompasses a very large campus taking up tens of square miles and 
divisions tend to be separated from each other geographically throughout the campus 
providing limited opportunities for interaction among employees in different divisions. 
Based upon these and other distinctions, any or all of the emergent processes 
discussed may lead to the emergence of security climate at the division, rather than 
organization, level.  Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H2a: Security climate is shared among employees within the same division. 
In addition to studying the emergence of safety climate within a single 
organization, Zohar (1980) also investigated whether shared safety perceptions varied 
between organizations in different industries.  His results suggested that safety climate 
varied among organizations employing different kinds of technologies that presented 
different levels of risk.  The combination of shared perceptions within individual 
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organizations and safety climate variations between organizations with different levels of 
risk led him to conclude that “a definable safety climate” (p. 99) existed within these 
organizations. 
In support of Zohar’s findings, a number of studies in the field have found that 
safety risk is related to the type of safety climate that exists within an organization.  For 
example, Cree and Kelloway (1997) found that employees’ perceptions of co-worker 
commitment to safety (a dimension of safety climate) predicted employees’ risk 
perceptions in a manufacturing environment.  Likewise, Huang and colleagues (Huang, 
Chen, DeArmond, Cigularov, & Chen, 2007) found that safety climate was negatively 
related to employees’ perceptions of injury risk.  However, this relationship was 
moderated by employees’ work shift. 
In addition to the differences between divisions mentioned previously, one 
significant difference between divisions concerns the amount of classified or sensitive 
work that is done.  Almost all of the work conducted in some divisions is of a classified 
or sensitive nature, some divisions conduct very little of this type of work, and many 
divisions fall somewhere between these two extremes.  The fact that divisions vary in the 
amount of classified work conducted creates inequity in the level of security exposure, or 
risk, they face.  If security climate does emerge at the division level (H2a) and division 
security climate is related to a division’s security risk, than the current study would be 
able to conclude, as Zohar did with safety climate, that a “definable security climate” 
exists within each division.  Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H2b: Division security climate will be related to division security exposure.  
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Outcomes of Security Climate 
Much of the interest in the construct of organizational climate is the result of 
efforts to better understand and improve organizational performance in some form or 
another.  And while results have been somewhat mixed, recent research has discovered 
significant relationships between climate and performance.  For example, Zohar (2000, 
2002) found a relationship between safety climate and organizational injury rates.  In 
addition, customer service climate has been found to predict customers’ ratings of service 
quality (Schneider, White, & Paul, 1998).   
 The expected effects of organizational climate on organizational performance 
generally rest on two core assumptions about employees within an organization 
(Schneider, 1975): “(1) humans attempt to apprehend order in their environment and to 
create order through thought; and (2) humans apprehend and/or attempt to create order in 
their environment so they can effectively adapt their behavior to the work environment” 
(p. 447).  The first assumption implies that employees desire, create, and maintain order 
in their workplace.  The second assumption implies that an ordered workplace helps 
employees determine what behaviors are appropriate in a given situation.   
In the context of security, employees comprehend order through security rules or 
practices regarding appropriate behavior.  They then adjust their actions in accordance 
with the order created at work.  In this way, when a positive security climate exists, 
employees are able to adjust their actions in a way that supports the security goals of the 
organization.  As a result, enhanced organizational security performance is expected in an 
organization with a strong security climate.   
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The current study sought to investigate this security climate-security performance 
relationship.  To do so, empirical measures of security performance had to be identified.  
One of the clearest indicators of an organization’s security performance is security event 
frequency.  Event frequency is simply the number of security events (standardized based 
on division size) that occur within a particular division over the course of a set time 
period.  This metric, similar to the use of injury rates when studying safety climate, is the 
primary measure of security performance used by many organizations.   
However, testing the security climate-event frequency relationship might be 
complicated by the divisional differences in security exposure described above.  This 
possibility is supported by years of research in the safety field.  In fact, Zohar (2000) 
points out that the importance of controlling for risk in the safety field was recognized at 
least as early as the 1930s when Heinrich (1931) proposed a model of industrial 
accidents.  This model suggested that the probability of an accident was determined by 
the confluence of both unsafe behaviors as well as unsafe conditions.  This second 
contributing factor constitutes risk and is analogous to security exposure in the current 
study.   
Unfortunately, some research from the field of occupational safety suggests that 
the relationship between risk and outcome is not so clear cut.  On the one hand, in a study 
of foundry workers at two different plants, Guastello and Guastello (1988) found that 
individuals working in the plant who used more hazardous equipment identified more 
risks associated with their work.  However, the high risk plant also experienced fewer 
accidents than employees working in a second plant that used less hazardous equipment.  
This result was attributed, in part, to the fact that employees in the higher risk – lower 
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accident rate plant were more experienced and better able to identify safety risks than 
those in the second plant.   
Despite this counterintuitive finding, there is ample reason to believe that risk has 
some relationship to outcomes when considering safety as well as security.  As such, it is 
prudent to control for security exposure in the current study.  With that in mind, the 
following research hypothesis regarding the security climate – security performance 
relationship is posited: 
H3a: Security climate will be negatively related to frequency of security events, after 
controlling for level of security exposure. 
 And while the frequency of security events is an important metric, it is not the only 
useful indicator of organizational security performance.  This is illustrated by the fact that 
some security events may be much more severe than others.  So even if two organizations 
experience the same number of events, their security performance isn’t the same if one 
organization experiences events that are more severe.  Therefore incident severity, which 
can be determined by the consequences or damage caused, is another important indicator 
of an organization’s security performance.  As such, the following research hypothesis is 
put forth: 
H3b: Security climate will be negatively related to severity of security events, after 
controlling for level of security exposure.  
Summary of Research Propositions 
 Due to the lack of research on security climate, the present study seeks to 1) 
develop the construct, 2) determine if climate does emerge within an organization and its 
sub-units, and 3) explore the relationship between security climate and security 
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performance.  To address the first goal, the following three research propositions have 
been put forth: 
H1a: Perceptions of management support for security is a dimension of security climate 
H1b: Perceptions of co-worker support for security is a dimension of security climate. 
H1c: Perceptions of security policies and procedures are a dimension of security climate. 
To address the second goal, the following research propositions have been put forth: 
H2a: Security climate is shared among employees within the same division. 
H2b: Division security climate will be related to division security exposure.  
To address the third goal, the following two research propositions have been put forth: 
H3a: Security climate will be negatively related to frequency of security events, after 
controlling for level of security exposure. 
H3b: Security climate will be negatively related to severity of security events, after 
controlling for level of security exposure. 
 
 




Background of the Studied Organization 
 After extensive discussions with its senior security managers, a large (primarily 
federally funded) research and development laboratory agreed to participate in this 
research by providing secondary data for use in the study.  The organization, which 
employs approximately 10,000 people either directly or through sub-contractors, operates 
as part of the United States Department of Energy (DoE).  And while the assets of the 
organization (e.g., facilities, equipment, etc.) are owned by the DoE, the operations and 
management of the laboratory is contracted out to a third party institution. 
The work conducted at the laboratory spans a wide range of academic and 
technical fields.  But despite this diversity, most of the work that is done is aligned with 
the organization’s primary mission of applying science and technology to address the 
challenging problems of national security.  Given the nature of this type of work, the 
organization is faced with numerous security concerns that range from everyday issues 
common to any organization operating today (e.g., petty theft by employees) to the most 
serious of threats common only to the few organizations that routinely deal with sensitive 
and classified information or technology (e.g., espionage by agents of a foreign 
government).   
As a result, it is not surprising that the organization places a great deal of 
emphasis on maintaining the highest level of security.  For example, the organization has 
an extensive set of security procedures which govern many aspects of the work 
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environment, new employees (even those who will never have access to sensitive 
information) go through rigorous background screening prior to beginning work, and 
existing employees are required to complete regular security training and refresher 
courses.  In addition, the organization utilizes cutting edge security technologies and 
maintains a full-time, well-trained, and extremely professional force of security officers.  
In light of characteristics such as these, the organization presents a unique opportunity to 
study the construct of security climate in a highly regulated environment.   
Data Sets Used in the Current Study 
The data used in the current study were extracted in four separate data sets which 
were provided by the organization.  While information from the first data set was 
analyzed separately from the others, the three remaining data sets included division 
identification as the single piece of demographic information.  Therefore, it was possible 
to aggregate data within each data set based on the divisional structure of the organization 
and then connect the three data sets at this level.  And although this demographic data 
made it possible to analyze the data sets at the division level, the rationale for doing so 
went beyond mere convenience.   First, the construct of organizational climate has 
traditionally been viewed as a group level variable as opposed to psychological climate 
which is conceptualized as an individual level variable (e.g., James and Jones, 1974).  In 
addition, divisions have an ample sample size of responses to the employee opinion 
survey as well as a base rate of security events that is high enough to conduct meaningful 
analyses.  Also, data at the division level contained sufficient variability given that 
divisions are all distinct from each other along a number of factors including the nature of 
their work (e.g., physics, chemistry, biology) and their geographic location (lab and 
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office space is spread out over many square miles making interaction between divisions 
less common).  Finally, some managers within the organization had expressed concerns 
about anonymity, and some of the data used in the study was simply unavailable at the 
individual level.  In light of these factors, analysis at the division level was deemed 
appropriate.  Each of these four data sets is briefly described below. 
Subject matter expert (SME) data set.  The first data set, referred to as the SME 
data set, consisted of qualitative data compiled as part of a review of business practices 
designed to better understand the impact of organizational dynamics on security 
performance.  The qualitative data was collected during interviews with ten employees of 
the organization who were identified by senior security managers as subject matter 
experts (SMEs) in security.  Eighty percent of the SMEs were male and 20% were 
female.  The SMEs had an average tenure with the organization of 14 years 4 months and 
an average of 18 years 7 months experience in the security field.   
The interviews consisted of a structured set of open-ended questions which were 
designed to probe the effect that a variety of organizational characteristics might have on 
the organization’s overall security performance.  Some of the topics addressed in the 
interviews included behaviors of senior managers, behaviors of direct supervisors, co-
worker behaviors, security policies and procedures, the effectiveness of security 
professionals, and conflicts between security and job demands.  SME responses to each 
question were recorded by hand, as close as possible to verbatim, and were transcribed 
into a word processing file immediately following each interview.  After all the 
interviews were completed, a total of 141 individual responses were aggregated together 
to form the SME data set.  At that point, both the paper and original electronic transcripts 
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of the individual SME interviews were destroyed so it was impossible to identify which 
responses came from which SMEs. 
Employee opinion survey (EOS) data set.  The second data set, referred to as the 
EOS data set, consisted of employees’ responses to an annual employee opinion survey 
(EOS) administered by the organization’s Human Resources division.  Three years of 
data were included in the EOS data set.  In Year One, the survey contained 49 questions 
assessing employees’ opinions on a wide range of topics such as security, safety, and job 
satisfaction.  There were 3694 responses in Year One distributed among 45 divisions (M 
= 82.09; SD = 86.53) with a total response rate of 43%.  In Year Two, the survey 
contained the same 49 questions.  There were 3711 responses in Year Two distributed 
among 49 divisions (M = 75.73; SD = 76.27) with a total response rate of 45%.  In Year 
Three, the same topic areas were covered but three additional questions were added to the 
survey for a total of 52 items.  Year Three contained 3649 responses distributed among 
fifty three divisions (M = 68.85; SD = 64.13) for a total response rate of 44%.   
Employees responded to the survey questions using a 5-point Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1 “disagree” to 5 “agree.”  In addition, employees had the option of 
selecting a sixth response of “don’t know.”  Responses using this option were treated as 
missing data.  Due to the anonymous nature of the survey it was impossible to track 
individual respondents from one year to the next, therefore it is possible that survey 
respondents within each division may or may not be the same from one administration of 
the survey to the next. 
Although a number of demographic questions are included in the employee 
opinion survey, due to the privacy concerns raised by the laboratory’s Human Resources 
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division the only piece of demographic data included in the EOS data set was the division 
where each respondent worked.  This information was used to aggregate responses on the 
survey at the division level as well as to connect the aggregated division scores to 
division level variables in the two remaining data sets.  Despite the fact that most 
demographic information was excluded from the data set, the HR division did provide 
information about the size of each division in the organization as well as some basic 
demographic information about the overall laboratory population.   
The population from which the EOS data was drawn includes technicians, staff 
members, and support personnel.  Technicians (e.g., welders, fabricators, machinists, 
etc.) typically have an educational level ranging from high school graduates to those with 
some college education such as an Associates’ Degree.  Staff members (e.g., physicists, 
chemists, mathematicians, etc.) are typically highly educated, generally with at least one 
graduate degree and most with a Ph.D.  Support personnel (e.g., administrative assistants, 
human resource professionals, accountants, etc.) vary widely in their level of education 
from high school graduates to those with a Ph.D.  Furthermore, the Human Resources 
Division has indicated that the laboratory traditionally has a very low turnover rate of 3% 
to 4% per year, although employees may move from one division to another. 
Event data set.  The third data set, referred to as the Event data set, was provided 
by the laboratory’s Security Division and consisted of information about all of the 
security events which were reported to the Security Division over a timeframe which 
overlapped the last two years of data included in the EOS data set.  Each security event in 
the Event data set included information that made it possible to determine which division 
(or divisions) the security event occurred in, what year it occurred in, and how severe the 
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event was.  Other information, such as whether the event was reported to the Security 
division by those responsible or by someone else, was also included.  This data made it 
possible to calculate a yearly measure of event frequency as well as event severity for 
every division included in the study.  These data points will be described in greater detail 
in the measures section. 
Exposure data set.  Each division varies in the amount of classified and sensitive 
work it conducts, from those divisions that do almost exclusively this type of work to 
those divisions that conduct virtually none of this type of work.  To account for these 
differences a fourth and final data set, referred to as the Exposure data set, was provided 
by the organization.  The Exposure data set consisted of a list of each of the divisions 
within the organization.  For each of the divisions, there were five estimates of the 
percentage of classified and sensitive work conducted within that division.  The estimates 
were provided by five separate security experts, each working independently, who were 
familiar with the divisions on the list.  The SMEs had an average tenure with the 
organization of 18 years and an average of 24 years 5 months experience in the security 
field. 
Measures 
Security climate.  Given that there were no a priori dimensions of security climate 
in the existing empirical climate literature, in order to establish a measure of the construct 
it was necessary to first identify potential dimensions.  Based upon the literature 
reviewed, three possible dimensions of security climate were identified and defined.  
These dimensions, along with their definitions, are shown in Table 1.  Using these 
proposed dimensions, six graduate students familiar with the literature on organizational 
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climate worked independently to sort the interview responses from the SME data set.  
These students were provided with an electronic file containing instructions for sorting 
the responses into these three categories as well as a fourth category of Not Applicable 
(see Appendix A) as well as a table listing the responses which was used to record their 
sorting results.  Agreement among the sorting results from these six judges was 
calculated as a test of the viability of these security climate dimensions.  The findings 
from these calculations will be reported in the Results section.  
Table 1 
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Based upon the dimensions identified above, a measure of security climate was 
then developed from the items on the organization’s annual employee opinion survey 
(i.e., the EOS data set).  Specifically, following the procedure of Griffin and Neal (2000), 
three researchers (one advanced graduate student in I/O psychology, one Ph.D. in I/O 
psychology, and one internationally recognized expert in the security field) independently 
sorted items from the employee opinion survey into one of the security climate 
dimensions.  If a researcher determined that a survey item did not fit in any of the climate 
dimensions, it was sorted into a category labeled “Other.”  After independently sorting 
each survey item, all three researchers met to discuss their decisions.  Any disagreements 
were discussed until unanimous agreement was reached; if agreement could not be 
reached the item was dropped from further consideration.  The results of this sorting 
procedure constituted the final security climate measure that was used in the study. 
Safety climate.  In addition to the security items, the EOS data set also included 
two items focused on employees’ views of safety within the organization.  Both of these 
items assessed employees’ perceptions of management support for safety, which was 
mentioned previously as a common dimension of safety climate (Flin, Mearns, O’Connor 
& Bryden, 2000; Ho, 2005; Seo, Torabi, Blair, & Ellis, 2004).  While safety climate is 
not a central concern of the research questions in this study, the inclusion of these items 
made it possible to assess the construct validity of security climate as well as the factor 
structure of the security climate measure.   
Frequency of security events.  The frequency of security events was calculated 
based on data contained in the Event data set which included information about when 
(month/year) and where (which division or divisions employ the responsible person or 
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people) each event occurred.  This data was used to determine the number of security 
events that occurred in each division over two separate one-year timeframes, which were 
defined as the beginning and end of the one-year interval starting when the employee 
opinion survey was administered.  Although the exact date of the survey administration 
did vary from one year to the next and took place over a two-to-three week period, it was 
typically started at the beginning of June.  Therefore, June 1 was established as the 
beginning of each year in this study.  Specifically, event frequency data for Year Two 
was calculated based on those events that occurred between June 1
st
 of Year Two and 
May 31
st
 of Year Three.  Likewise, frequency data for Year Three was based on events 
occurring between June 1
st
 of Year Three and May 31
st
 of the calendar year following 
Year Three. 
It should be noted that the process used in this study for calculating the number of 
security events that occurred in each division differs somewhat from the process of 
record keeping used by the organization.  As noted, some events result from actions of 
more than one person and the various individuals sometimes work in different divisions.  
In such situations the organization will make a determination, based on investigation 
results, as to where the event should be attributed.  After an extensive investigation of 
each security event, the organization attributes the event to the division that employs the 
person found to be primarily responsible for the event.  While this process may be 
appropriate for record keeping and auditing purposes, it is insufficient for a study of the 
relationship between security climate and security performance resulting from employee 
actions.  Specifically, if a security event is the result of actions from multiple employees 
it is important to account for the actions of every employee involved.  Since the 
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organization’s security event database includes enough information to identify the 
division affiliation of every person deemed to have some responsibility for a security 
event, even if it isn’t the primary responsibility, it is possible to account for the actions of 
these additional employees.  Therefore, for each event in the database, this study credited 
an event to every division employing someone involved.  Specifically, if a security event 
occurred that was deemed to be primarily the result of actions by an individual in 
Division A, and to a lesser extent an individual in Division B, both Division A and B 
were credited with one security event.  In order to maintain consistency, if a security 
event is deemed to be the responsibility of two individuals from the same division, that 
division was credited for two security events (one for each of the two individuals 
involved). 
However, it would be inappropriate to simply use a raw tally of the number of 
security events per division as a metric of event frequency.  The reason for this is that 
different divisions within the organization can vary greatly in terms of size, sometimes by 
a factor of ten or more.  As an illustration, consider the case of two hypothetical 
divisions.  The two divisions may be very similar in many ways.  In both cases, about 
50% of the work done is of a sensitive nature, and the employees of both divisions seem 
to take their responsibility for security very seriously.  Likewise, both divisions 
experienced five separate security events during a given year.  However, one division had 
500 employees in that year whereas the other only had 250 employees.  If everything 
about the two divisions is identical, except for the fact that one has twice as many 
employees as the other, then the laws of probability suggest that the larger division would 
likely experience twice as many security events as the smaller one over the course of the 
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same time period.  But by only looking at the raw numbers of security events in a given 
year, it would appear that the two divisions exhibited an equal level of security 
performance during that time period.  It is only when division size is taken into account 
that the true differences in security performance can be seen.   
This is clearly not a groundbreaking concept.  In the related field of safety 
research, it is common to report an organization’s accident rate by taking the size of the 
organization’s workforce into consideration (e.g., Silva, Lima, & Baptista, 2004).  
Therefore, the current study employed a relatively simple process to standardize the 
security event frequency metric based on division size.  That process was simply a matter 
of dividing a division’s raw event frequency tally by the number of employees it has and 
then multiplying that by 100.  This metric conceptualizes a division’s event frequency as 
the number of security events per 100 employees.   
Event severity.  Event severity refers to the potential impact or damage an event 
may cause.  When the organization becomes aware that a security event has occurred, one 
of its trained security investigators is assigned to the case.  During the course of the 
investigation, the investigator makes a determination about the severity of the event 
based on a categorical severity rating system developed by the DoE for use at all of the 
facilities within the department.  This system, called the Impact Measurement Index 
(IMI), consists of four event categories that have been labeled IMI-1 (the most severe on 
the scale) through IMI-4 (the least severe on the scale).  If the organization’s security 
investigators determine that an event falls into one of these categories, than the 
organization must report it to the DoE.  These IMI categories are explained in more detail 
in Table 2.   















Any security incident that can be expected to cause serious damage to 




Any security incident that can be expected to cause damage to national 




Any security incident with a low probability of causing damage to 




Any security incident that causes no damage to national security, but 
that can, in combination, indicate weakened security awareness or 
inadequate procedures and practices. 
Note: Descriptions in this table are taken verbatim from DoE N 471.3 (U.S. Department 
of Energy, 2001)  
There is a fifth category of security events, not included in the IMI system, which 
was included in the present study.  This category consists of those events that are 
determined to cause no damage to national security, and therefore do not fall into one of 
the four IMI categories.  This type of event is often referred to as “sub-reportable” 
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because the occurrence of the event does not have to be reported to the DoE.  However, 
sub-reportable events can be viewed as indicative of poor employee security behaviors 
because even though they do not result in damage to national security they occur as a 
result of employee actions or inactions which violate the established security protocols.  
This is somewhat analogous to the idea of near misses (Bird & Germain, 1996) or micro-
accidents (Zohar, 2000) in the safety literature.  Because they represent poor employee 
security behaviors, they were included in the current study. 
Every security event in the Event data set had already been assigned a severity 
ranking, even if it was determined to be sub-reportable, by a trained investigator.  
Therefore, it was possible to create a metric of overall event severity that could be 
calculated for all divisions in both Year Two and Year Three.  The metric was created by 
applying weights to the severity of the events that occurred in a given division over the 
course of a given year.  The least severe of the five categories used in the study, sub-
reportable events, was assigned a weight of 1.  The second lowest category, IMI 4 events, 
was assigned a weight of 2.  IMI 3 events were assigned a weight of 3, IMI 2 events were 
assigned a weight of 4, and the most severe IMI 1 events were assigned a weight of 5.  
Then each event in the data set was multiplied by the weight assigned to its level of 
severity.  Finally, the weighted severity values for each of the events attributed to a 
division over the course of each year were added together and this sum was divided by 
the total number of security events attributed to the division over that same time period.  
This process was repeated for each division in both Year Two and Year Three.  The 
result, essentially a weighted average of the severity of events occurring in a division 
over a one-year time period, served as the metric of event severity.   
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Division security exposure.  Each division’s security exposure, which refers to the 
amount of classified or sensitive work conducted within the division, was calculated 
based on data in the Exposure data set.  The estimates of the percentage of classified 
work conducted by each division, provided by the five security experts, were averaged 
together to come up with an estimate that was not overly biased by any one individual’s 
estimates.  Prior to doing so, however, the estimates of all five of the experts were 
correlated to assess the reliability of these estimates.  For Year Two, the correlations 
ranged from r = .59 to r = .81 and all were significant at the p < .05 level.  For Year 
Three, the correlations ranged from r = .59 to r = .82 and again all were significant at the 
p < .05 level.  Given these results, it was concluded that the expert’s estimates were 
highly reliable.  Therefore, the averages across all five experts were calculated for each 
division in both Year Two and Year Three and these averages were used as the metric of 
each division’s security exposure.  




 The results of this study are presented in three sections.  First, evidence 
supporting the existence of the three distinct security climate dimensions proposed in 
Hypothesis 1a-1c are presented.  Then, results supporting the emergent nature of security 
climate within divisions (proposed in Hypothesis 2a) and the relationship between 
security climate and security exposure (proposed in Hypothesis 2b) are presented.  
Finally, results of the analyses testing the relationship between security climate and 
various security performance metrics (proposed in H3a and H3b) are reported. 
Dimensions of Security Climate 
Hypothesis 1a-1c proposed that security climate is a multidimensional construct 
consisting of at least three separate dimensions including perceptions of management 
support for security (H1a), co-worker support for security (H1b), and security policies 
and procedures (H1c).  The hypothesis was tested by analyzing the extent of agreement 
among judges in the sorting task.  Since judges were instructed to group responses from 
the SME data set into categories representing the three proposed dimensions, results 
indication agreement in their sorting decisions would provide evidence supporting the 
construct validity of the three hypothesized dimensions.  
Data from the sorting task was analyzed using a Microsoft Excel template (King, 
2004) designed to calculate Fleiss’s kappa (Fleiss, 1971).  Fleiss’s kappa, also referred to 
as generalized kappa, was chosen to assess agreement in this study because it was 
designed to assess the level of chance corrected agreement among judges using a nominal 
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or categorical response scale.  In addition, unlike Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 1960) and 
weighted kappa (Cohen, 1968) which are restricted to situations where there are only two 
judges, Fleiss’s kappa was designed for use where there are more than two judges as long 
as the number of judges rating each item or subject remains constant.   
The agreement among judges (n = 6) sorting the 141 SME responses into the 
proposed categories (k = 4) was kappa = 0.68 (p < .05), 95% CI (0.65, 0.71).  This 
finding is important because it suggests that agreement among judges’ was significantly 
greater than what would be expected by chance.  However, the calculation of kappa 
accounts for all sorting decisions across each category and therefore should only be 
interpreted as a measure of overall agreement among judges.  In order to fully test the 
first hypothesis, agreement among judges within individual categories also had to be 
evaluated.  Fortunately, it is possible to calculate kappa for individual categories using 
two equations provided by Fleiss (Equation 23 and Equation 27 in Fleiss, 1960).   
Based on these equations, additional analyses were conducted to evaluate the 
agreement among judges within each of the three categories representing the proposed 
climate dimensions.  Rater agreement for category one, the dimension of management 
support for security, was kappa = 0.85 (p < .05), 95% CI (0.72, 0.98).  Thus Hypothesis 
1a, which proposed that perceptions of management support for security is a dimension 
of security climate, was supported.  Rater agreement for category two, the dimension of 
perceptions of co-worker support for security, was kappa = 0.63 (p < .05), 95% CI (0.51, 
0.74).  Thus Hypothesis 1b, which proposed that perceptions of co-worker support for 
security is a dimension of security climate, was supported.  Rater agreement for category 
three, the dimension of security policies and procedures, was kappa = 0.68 (p < .05), 95% 
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CI (0.55, 0.82).  Thus Hypothesis 1c, which proposed that perceptions of security policies 
and procedures are a dimension of security climate, was also supported.  
Emergence of Security Climate 
The second goal of this research was to determine whether a definable security 
climate does emerge within an organization and its sub-units, in this case divisions.  
Specifically, H2a proposed that security climate would be shared among employees 
working within the same division.  In addition, H2a proposed that security climate would 
vary between divisions in relation to division security exposure.  However, before these 
hypotheses could be tested, preliminary analyses were necessary to identify a subset of 
items from the organization’s annual employee opinion survey that could serve as a 
measure of security climate.   
Preliminary analyses.  The process of identifying this subset of items (described 
above in the Measures section under the heading “Security Climate”) led to the selection 
of just three items, out of fifty-two, that were deemed to assess dimensions of the security 
climate construct.  These items included: 1) “My Supervisor is actively involved in 
promoting good security practices,” 2) “I feel safe reporting potential security incidents 
in which I am directly involved,” and 3) “I can readily obtain security information needed 
to perform my job.”  The first item was identified as a measure of the management 
support of security climate and the second and third items were both categorized as 
tapping the policies and procedures dimension of security climate.  However, given the 
limited number of items overall, the limited number of items assigned to any single 
dimension, and the fact that the dimension of co-worker support for security was not 
represented by any items the decision was made to combine the three items into one 
                                                                                
43 
 
global security climate measure rather than grouping them into dimensional sub-scales.  
This approach also permitted a limited psychometric evaluation of the security climate 
measure.    
The psychometric evaluation of the measure was conducted separately on data 
from Year One, Year Two, and Year Three.  The first step was to analyze the proposed 
three-item security climate scale with confirmatory factor analysis via LISREL.  The 
limited number of security climate items available in the data set made testing the single 
factor security measure problematic.  Specifically, it constitutes a just-identified model 
and thus does not meet the statistical identification requirements inherent in structural 
equation modeling.  In order to create a meaningful model that could be statistically 
evaluated, it was necessary to add two additional items to the proposed model.  The 
additional items, drawn from the same employee opinion survey, assessed employees’ 
perceptions of safety at the organization.  By adding the safety items to the proposed 
model the issue of statistical identification was addressed.  The additional items also 
created an opportunity to test the items’ discriminant validity between the security 
climate and safety climate constructs.   
The combination of the security and safety items resulted in a proposed two-factor 
measurement model consisting of three security items loading on a security climate factor 
and two safety items loading on a safety climate factor (see Figure 1).  A one-factor 
competing model was also evaluated by constraining the correlation between the security 
and safety factors from the first model to be equal to 1.0.  As a result, this one-factor 
model was nested within the two-factor model.  Thus, the two models were contrasted 
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Figure 1. Two-factor measurement model for security climate and safety climate; one-
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proposed two-factor model fit the data better than the alternative one-factor model.  The 
model comparison was repeated for each of the three years of climate data.   
As shown in Table 3, the Δχ
2
 was significant in each of the three years.  These 
results provide evidence of discriminant validity for the construct of security climate.  
And while the comparisons between the one-factor and two-factor models suggest that 
the two-factor model is superior on a relative basis, it was still necessary to establish the 
adequacy of the two-factor structure in and of itself.  Therefore, results from the two-




 statistic of overall fit was significant in Year One (χ
2
(4) = 70.44, p < .05), 
Year Two (χ
2
(4) = 106.10, p < .05) and Year Three (χ
2
(4) = 85.78, p < .05).  These results 
suggest that the proposed two-factor model does not fit the data well.  However a 
significant χ
2
 is common when working with large sample sizes such as those from the 
three years of climate data that were analyzed here.  To address this inherent problem 
with χ
2
, a number of additional fit indices have been developed and were employed in the 
current study.  The Normed Fit Index (NFI) represents the degree to which the model fits 
better than the baseline independence, or null, model and indicates the proportion of 
improvement in fit over a poorly fitting model (Bentler & Bonett, 1980).  The NFI for 
Year One, Year Two, and Year Three were NFI = .99, NFI = .98, and NFI = .99 
respectively indicating strong fit for the two-factor model in all three years.  The 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) is a revision of the NFI that was developed (Bentler, 1992) 
to take sample size into account.  A CFI value of 0.95 or above indicates very good fit, 
but cutoff values having a magnitude of 0.90 or above are commonly viewed as 
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acceptable (Bollen, 1989; Hoyle & Panter, 1995).  The CFI indicated very good fit for 
Year One (CFI = .99), Year Two (CFI = .99), and Year Three (CFI = .99).  The Goodness 
of Fit Index (GFI) evaluates the variance and covariance in the sample that is explained 
by a hypothesized population.  Results from Year One (GFI = .99), Year Two (GFI = 
.99), and Year Three (GFI = .99) surpassed .90 which has been established as the cutoff 
for GFI values indicating good model fit.  The Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) is 
identical to the GFI except that it is adjusted based on the degrees of freedom in the 
hypothesized model.  AGFI results for Year One (AGFI = .97), Year Two (AGFI = .95), 
and Year Three (AGFI = .96) indicated good model fit for each year.  The final fit 
statistic used was the RMSEA which is the root mean square error of approximation 
adjusted for degrees of freedom in the proposed model.  Values of RMSEA that are 
greater than .10 are unacceptable (Steiger, 1990).  In addition, Steiger has urged the 
reporting of 90% confidence intervals (CI) around the RMSEA value in order to 
determine the precision of these values (smaller confidence intervals indicate more 
precise estimates).  The RMSEA results for Year One (RMSEA = .07; 90% CI = .055, 
.085), Year Two (RMSEA = .09; 90% CI = .074, .10) and Year Three (RMSEA = .08; 
90% CI = .066, .095) were only modest.  However, the RMSEA values were all below 
.10 and the 90% confidence intervals were relatively small and never exceeded .10.  
Therefore, these results were deemed acceptable indicators that the data fit the proposed 
model.  Despite the significant χ
2
 results, the unanimously positive results obtained for 
the subsequent fit indices suggests that the two-factor measurement model fits the data 
from all three years reasonably well.  
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Following the confirmatory factor analysis, item analyses were conducted to 
assess the reliability of the three item security climate measure.  Item-total correlations 
and coefficient alpha were calculated for each of the three years.  In Year One, item-total 
correlations ranged from r = .44 to r = .48 and coefficient alpha was .64.  For Year Two, 
item-total correlations ranged from r = .47 to r = .49 and coefficient alpha was equal to 
.66. In Year Three, item-total correlations ranged from r = .48 to r = .53 while coefficient 
alpha was .68.  These internal consistency results were deemed acceptable (although not 
ideal) given that the three items that comprise the scale address slightly different 
components of security climate.  In light of the exploratory nature of the study, the 
decision was made to retain all three items for the security climate scale. 
As a final analysis prior to testing H2a and H2b, the security climate data for each 
year were screened for the presence and pattern of missing data.  Initially, Year One data 
contained 3694 cases distributed among 45 divisions (M = 82.09; SD = 86.53) and the 
response rate within each division ranged from 26% to 82% (M = 43%).  After reviewing 
the data, 389 cases were deleted due to missing data.  In addition, an a priori decision was 
made to exclude divisions with fewer than three cases and as a result three cases from 
two divisions were also deleted.  This left 3302 cases and 43 divisions (M = 76.79; SD = 
78.52).  Two chi-square tests were conducted to explore the pattern of both response rates 
as well as missing data across divisions.  The chi-square for response rates was found to 
be significant, χ
2
(42) = 210.26, p < .05.  The result of the examination of missing data 
was also significant, χ
2
(42) = 88.35, p < .05.  These findings suggest that divisions 
showed disproportional response rates and proportion of cases with missing data in Year 
One. 
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Year Two data contained 3711 cases distributed among 49 divisions (M = 75.73; 
SD = 76.27) and the response rate within each division, with the exception of one 
division where the population was unknown, ranged from 24% to 86% (M = 45%).  After 
reviewing the data, 329 cases were deleted due to missing data and two cases from a 
single division were deleted because the division contained less than three cases.  This 
left 3380 cases and 48 divisions (M = 70.42; SD = 70.13).  As was done with Year One, 
the pattern of response rates and missing data were examined by way of chi-square tests.  
The result of the chi-square examining response rates was significant, χ
2
(46) = 206.77, p 
< .05.  Likewise, the examination of missing data produced significant results, χ
2
(47) = 
82.75, p < .05.  This indicates that the rate of responding and the proportion of cases with 
missing data were unequal across divisions in Year Two.   
Data from Year Three initially contained 3649 cases distributed among 53 
divisions (M = 68.85; SD = 64.13) and the response rate within each division ranged 
from 26% to 83% (M = 44%).  As a result of missing data, 325 cases were deleted.  In 
addition, 2 cases were deleted because each was the sole response for their respective 
divisions, leaving 3322 cases and 51 divisions (M = 65.14; SD = 58.93).  Again, the 
patterns of response rates and missing data were examined by way of two chi-square 
tests.  The examination of response rates across divisions produced significant chi-square 
results, χ
2
(50) = 279.18, p < .05.  A significant chi-square was also found when 
examining the proportion of missing cases across divisions, χ
2
(50) = 101.76, p < .05.  As 
above, Year Three results suggest that divisions were unequal on both response rate as 
well as the proportion of cases with missing data. 
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Hypothesis 2a.  In order to test the hypothesis that security climate perceptions are 
shared among employees working within the same division, and thus that it is an 
emergent phenomenon, the level of consensus among employees on the security climate 
measure was assessed.  Consensus was assessed by calculating rwg(j) (James, Demaree, & 
Wolf, 1984, 1993), intraclass correlations (ICC1, Bartko, 1976; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) 
where k was replaced by the harmonic mean of group size, the reliability of the mean 
(ICC2; Bartko, 1976), as well as between unit variance.  These indices were calculated at 
the division level for all three years of data. 
For Year One, the average rwg(j) = .76 and ranged from .54 to .96.  The intraclass 
correlation and reliability of the mean were found to be ICC1 = .08 and ICC2 = .59 
respectively.  Between unit variance was tested with one-way analysis of variance where 
respondents’ division affiliation served as the independent variable and responses on the 
security climate scale was the dependent variable.  Results indicated that the security 
climate was significantly different among divisions, F(42, 3259) = 2.45, p < .05. 
Each of these indices were calculated for Year Two, resulting in an average rwg(j) 
= .74 and ranged from .18 to .98.  The intraclass correlation and reliability of the mean 
were ICC1 = .05 and ICC2 = .41 respectively.  The one-way analysis of variance 
indicated that the security climate was significantly different among divisions, F(47, 
3332) = 1.70, p < .05. 
For Year Three, the average rwg(j) = .77 and ranged from .32 to .98.  The intraclass 
correlation and reliability of the mean were found to be ICC1 = .08 and ICC2 = .59 
respectively.  The one-way analysis of variance indicated that the security climate was 
significantly different among divisions, F(50, 3271) = 2.41, p < .05. 
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Taken together, the results obtained from data in Year One, Year Two, and Year 
Three support the assertion of Hypothesis 2a.  That is, security climate perceptions do 
exhibit sufficiently high homogeneity among employees working within the same 
division so it can be said that the security climate construct is an emergent phenomenon.  
Therefore, individual responses were combined by averaging responses at the division 
level while testing each of the remaining hypotheses.   
Hypothesis 2b.  While the one-way analysis of variance results for Years One 
through Year Three described for H2a above suggest that security climate does vary 
among different divisions within the organization, Hypothesis 2b takes that idea one step 
further.  Specifically, H2b proposes that divisions’ security climate would be related to 
divisions’ security exposure levels.  To test this proposition, bivariate correlation 
coefficients were computed between each division’s average security exposure ratings 
from the SME data set and the security climate measure aggregated at the division level.  
H2b was only tested using data from Year Two and Year Three because security 
exposure data was unavailable for Year One.   
For Year Two, the correlation between security exposure and security climate was 
both negative and significant (r = -.34, p < .05, N = 48).  The correlation for Year Three 
was also negative and significant (r = -.29, p < .05, N = 51).  Taken together, these results 
provide support for Hypothesis 2b.  Specifically, the significant negative correlations 
indicate that as security exposure increases security climate tends to decrease. 
Outcomes of Security Climate 
The third and final goal of the study was to explore whether security climate 
predicted security performance, over and above what is predicted by division security 
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exposure.  To that end, Hypotheses 3a and 3b were proposed to examine the relationship 
between security climate, after controlling for division security exposure, and the security 
performance metrics of frequency of security incidents as well as severity of security 
events.  These proposed relationships were tested with hierarchical regression.  
Specifically, for both security performance measures, four separate regression analyses 
were conducted.  In each case, the first two analyses were structured to evaluate the effect 
of security climate on security performance immediately thereafter.  For example, the 
security performance measure from Year Two served as the dependent variable while 
security exposure in Year Two (entered in the first step of the regression as a control) and 
security climate in Year Two (entered in the second step of the regression) served as the 
independent variables.  This structure was then repeated using data from Year Three.  
The two remaining regression analyses were structured to evaluate the effect of security 
climate on security performance after a one year lag.  For example, the security 
performance measure from Year Two served as the dependent variable while security 
exposure in Year Two (entered in the first step of the regression as a control) and security 
climate in Year One (entered in the second step of the regression) served as the 
independent variables.  This analysis was then repeated with data from Year Two and 
Year Three.   
As a final point, the rationale behind the structure of the last two analyses (using 
performance data from Year X in combination with climate data from Year X minus one) 
should be clear given the goal of exploring one year lagged effects.  What might be less 
clear, and thus worthy of noting, is the rationale for using security exposure data from 
Year X rather than Year X minus one.  Essentially, this decision had two key drivers.  
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First, we are interested in the lagged effects of security climate and not security exposure.  
Second, it seems reasonable to expect that security performance over the course of a year 
would be impacted by the security exposure (i.e. risk) that exists during that same time 
period rather than during the period before or after. 
Preliminary analyses.  Prior to conducting the regression analysis, a number of 
steps were taken to screen the data.  First, every variable was examined for adherence to 
the assumptions of regression including normality as well as the existence of univariate 
and multivariate outliers.  This screening process was repeated for each regression 
analysis. For this reason, as well as the presence of some missing data, sample sizes 
varied for each analysis.   
Normality was assessed by exploring each variable for the presence of skewness 
or kurtosis.  Examination of the two years of data collected for the two dependent 
variables (event frequency and event severity) did reveal evidence of non-normal 
distributions.  Event frequency exhibited modest positive skew in Year Two and 
moderate positive skew and kurtosis in Year Three.  Event severity data in Year Two 
showed evidence of modest positive skewness and kurtosis while Year Three showed 
signs of slight positive skewness but no kurtosis.  Despite these results, the decision was 
made to forgo transforming the data to create normal distributions for two reasons.  First, 
regression is typically robust to moderate violations, such as those found in the present 
study, of the normality assumption (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).  In addition, 
data transformation is typically avoided if doing so makes it difficult to interpret results 
using data on a meaningful scale, which is the case for the two dependent variables.  The 
independent variables were also examined for normality.  Overall, all three years of 
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security climate data and both years of security exposure data were found to be normally 
distributed.      
Variables were also examined for the presence of outliers.  Univariate outliers 
were identified on the basis of cases 3.29 standard deviations above or below the mean 
and multivariate outliers were identified with Mahalanobis distance (using the generally 
accepted p < .001 level as the cutoff).  Any cases identified as univariate or multivariate 
outliers were excluded from the analysis.  Because the identification of multivariate 
outliers depends on the variables included in a given analysis, and there are a number of 
variable combinations employed in H3a and 3b, individual discussions of outliers will 
precede each of the regression analyses below. 
In addition to the data screening just described, two steps were taken to conduct 
preliminary analysis of the data utilized in Hypothesis 3a and 3b prior to conducting the 
primary regression analyses.  Descriptive statistics and correlations were calculated for 
all of the variables.  These results, which are presented in Table 4, reveal a number of 
findings that merit attention.  First, the near-perfect correlation between the security 
exposure ratings in Year Two and Year Three (r = .99, p < .05, N = 66) may be deemed 
suspect and perhaps the result of improper data entry.  However, a review and reanalysis 
of the raw data led to the same result.  Although it cannot be proven, a possible 
explanation for this extremely high correlation might be the way in which the data was 
collected.  The yearly exposure data, consisting of average SME ratings of each 
division’s exposure, were collected a little more than two years after the end of Year 
Three and both years of data were collected at the same time.  It is possible that this led to 
error of measurement.  Unfortunately, the process used to gather this information was the 
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only method that was acceptable to the organization.  However, as was mentioned 
previously, the interrater reliability among the SME ratings was sufficiently high to 
provide some confidence in the data that was collected.   
Second, as the table indicates, the correlations between the three years of security 
climate data revealed that the correlation between Year One and Year Two was not 
significant (r = .26, p > .05, N = 39) whereas the correlations between Year One and Year 
Three as well as Year Two and Year Three were strongly positive (r = .68, p < .05, N = 
34 and r = .56, p < .05, N = 42, respectively).  These correlations could be interpreted as 
an assessment of test-retest reliability and the results suggest mixed evidence for the 
stability of the security climate measure over time.  However, using these results to draw 
conclusions about the stability of the security climate measure may not be justified 
because it is not known whether the underlying variable being measured (security 
climate) should exhibit temporal stability.  It has been argued that the general climate 
construct is difficult to alter once established (Ostroff et al., 2003), which implies 
stability over time.  But research (e.g., Jackofsky & Slocum, 1988) has also shown that 
some types of climate (e.g., participative climate) are more stable than others (e.g., 
transcient climate).  In light of these contrasting expectations regarding the stability of 
climate, the appropriateness of using the test-retest method to assess the reliability of the 
measure is unclear.  Therefore, while acknowledging these mixed results, the conclusion 
of acceptable reliability of the security climate measure is maintained on the basis of 
these results and the internal consistency results discussed previously. 
The last results from Table 4 that will be discussed are the correlations between 
frequency and severity of security events.  The correlations between these two dependent 
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variables were not significant in either Year Two or Year Three, (r = -.17, p > .05, N = 38 
and r = -.29, p > .05, N = 39, respectively).  The non-significant correlations are 
important because they suggest that event frequency and event severity measure distinct 
aspects of a division’s overall security performance.  This can be viewed as support for 
their inclusion as two separate dependent variables in the current study. 
One final set of preliminary analyses were conducted prior to running the main 
regression analyses meant to test Hypotheses 3a and 3b.  This final step was deemed 
necessary due to the six significant chi-square results that were attained when exploring 
the pattern of response rates and proportion of cases with missing data from the security 
climate items.  The significant chi-square results suggested that employee response rates 
to the survey as well as missing data within the three security climate items was 
disproportionate across the various divisions in each of the three years.  This raised a 
legitimate question about whether the pattern of either response rates or missing data was 
in anyway related to the dependent variables utilized in H3a or H3b.  If so, any possible 
relationships could potentially constitute a spurious relationship and thus call into 
question the robustness of the primary regression analyses if not controlled.     
 To examine this possibility the survey response rates and proportion of cases with 
missing data (which were both operationalized as percentages) from Year One, Year 
Two, and Year Three were correlated with the two dependent variables from Year Two 
and Year Three.  The 24 correlations were calculated which ranged from r = -.27 to r = 
.23 and none were significant at the p < .01 level (which was used rather than .05 level 
used for the other analyses in this study to reduce the likelihood of Type 1 error).  These 
results suggest that neither response rates nor missing data rates were likely to threaten 
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the planned regression analyses.  Therefore, neither variable was controlled in the testing 
of Hypotheses 3a and 3b.      
Hypothesis 3a.  At this point it is now possible to focus attention on testing the 
proposed security climate – security performance relationships.  I turn first to Hypothesis 
3a which posited that security climate would predict the frequency of security events over 
and above what was predicted by security exposure.  The first regression analysis 
conducted to test H3a included only data from Year Two.  Exploration of Year Two data 
revealed two divisions with missing data which were therefore deleted.  The data 
revealed no univariate or multivariate outliers.  As a result, the final regression analysis 
was conducted on a total of 46 divisions.   
To control for division security exposure, that variable was entered first into the 
regression equation and was found to be a significant predictor of security event 
frequency, R
2
 = .34, F(1,44) = 22.18, p < .05.  In the second step, security climate was 
entered into the regression equation.  Results indicated that in Year Two security climate 
failed to predict security event frequency over and above security exposure, ΔR
2
 = .03, 
F(1,43) = 2.19, p > .05. 
A second regression analysis, identical to the one above except that Year Three 
data was used in place of data from Year Two, was conducted to test H3a.  None of the 
variables from Year Three contained missing data.  One division was found to be a 
univariate outlier but no multivariate outliers were found.  As a result, the final regression 
analysis was conducted on a total of 50 divisions.   
Division security exposure was entered first into the regression equation and was 
found to be a significant predictor of event frequency, R
2
 = .11, F(1,48) = 5.71, p < .05.  
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Security climate was then entered in the second step.  Results indicated that in Year 
Three security climate was a significant predictor of security event frequency over and 
above security exposure ΔR
2
 = .09, F(1,47) = 5.15, p < .05. 
In order to test for a lagged relationship between security climate and event 
frequency, a third regression analysis was conducted.  Specifically, security event 
frequency from Year Two served as the dependent variable while security exposure from 
Year Two and security climate from Year One served as independent variables.  None of 
the divisions contained either univariate or multivariate outliers.  Due to the lack of Year 
One security climate data for a number of cases, only 39 divisions were included in the 
analysis.   
Year Two security exposure was entered in the first step and was found to be a 
significant predictor of security event frequency in Year Two, R
2
 = .15, F(1,37) = 6.72, p 
< .05.  In the second step, security climate for Year One was entered.  Results indicated 
that security climate for Year One was a significant predictor of event frequency in Year 
Two over and above Year Two security exposure, ΔR
2
 = .10, F(1,36) = 4.93, p < .05. 
Finally, a fourth regression similar to the one above was completed to test for a 
lagged relationship between security climate and event frequency.  In other words, 
security event frequency from Year Three served as the dependent variable and security 
exposure from Year Three and security climate from Year Two served as independent 
variables.  No univariate or multivariate outliers were identified.  Because of 
organizational restructuring between Year Two and Year Three, some divisions which 
existed in Year Two no longer existed in Year Three.  Thus, those divisions were deleted 
listwise resulting in a total of 42 divisions that were included in the analysis.   
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After step 1, security exposure in Year Three was found to be a significant 
predictor of security event frequency in Year Three, R
2
 = .09, F(1,40) = 4.11, p < .05.  
However, results from step 2 indicated that security climate for Year Two was not a 
significant predictor of event frequency in Year Three over and above Year Three 
security exposure, ΔR
2
 = .02, F(1,39) = 0.61, p > .05. 
Overall, two of the four analyses found security climate significantly improved 
the prediction of event frequency over and above security exposure alone.  However, a 
more detailed examination of the results (see Table 5) revealed positive regression 
weights (β) on security climate for both of the above significant results (i.e., security 
climate in Year 1 predicted security event frequency in Year 2, and security climate in 
Year 3 predicted security event frequency in Year 3).  This suggests that as security 
climate increases so does event frequency, which runs counter to the proposed direction 
of the relationship.  Therefore, it is impossible to claim even mixed support for 
Hypothesis 3a.   
Nonetheless, these significant findings were further scrutinized in order to provide 
some clarity regarding the nature of the results.  Additional review of the results revealed 
tolerance levels well within acceptable limits indicating no problems of multicollinearity 
in either analysis.  However, evidence of a suppression effect was present in both sets of 
results.  In brief, a suppressor variable is identified if its inclusion in a regression 
equation improves the predictive validity of a second variable simply by suppressing 
criterion-irrelevant variance from the second variable.  The classical notion of 
suppression (Horst, 1941) has been expanded to include additional situations such as 
negative suppression (Darlington, 1968) and reciprocal suppression (Conger, 1974).  The 
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focus here will be on the later situation, reciprocal suppression, because the pattern of 
results point to the occurrence of this type of suppression.   
Reciprocal suppression in a two-predictor regression equation occurs when each 
predictor variable is acting as a suppressor on the other.  The existence of reciprocal 
suppression can be identified when two predictors are positively correlated with a 
criterion, are negatively correlated with each other, and both predictors’ zero-order 
correlations with the criterion are smaller than their respective βs.  All of these conditions 
were present in the results of both significant analyses from H3a which suggests the 
existence of reciprocal suppression effects.  Because this pattern was found in some of 
the remaining analyses, results for each will be summarized prior to the discussion of 
how to interpret regression findings when suppression occurs.  
Hypothesis 3b.  Hypothesis 3b proposed that security climate would predict 
severity of security events over and above what was predicted by security exposure.  
Following the process used for H3a, the proposed relationship in H3b was tested via four 
separate regression analyses.  The first and second analyses used data from Year Two and 
data from Year Three, respectively.  These were then followed by two additional lagged 
analyses, first using combined data from Years One and Two and then using combined 
data from Years Two and Three.   
Exploration of data from Year Two revealed a number of divisions that contained 
missing data.  This was because average event severity could not be calculated for 
divisions that did not experience any security events in Year Two.  However, no 
univariate or multivariate outliers were identified.  As a result, the final regression 
analysis was conducted on a total of 38 divisions.   
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Severity of security events served as the dependent variable in the regression 
equation.  As before, in order to control for division security exposure it was entered in 
the first step of the regression equation.  Results indicated that security exposure in Year 
Two was not a significant predictor of event severity in Year Two, R
2
 = .00, F(1,36) = 
0.01, p > .05.  Then Year Two security climate was entered in the second step of the 
regression and was found to be a significant predictor of event severity over and above 
security exposure ΔR
2
 = .15, F(1,35) = 6.01, p < .05. 
A second regression analysis, identical to the one above except that Year Three 
data was used in place of data from Year Two, was conducted to test H3b.  Exploration 
of data from Year Three, as with Year Two, revealed a number of cases with missing data 
due to the inability to calculate event severity for divisions that experienced no security 
events.  Again, no univariate or multivariate outliers were found.  As a result, the final 
regression analysis was conducted on a total of 39 divisions.   
The regression was conducted by entering security exposure into the first step and 
security climate in the second step.  Results from the first step of the regression equation 
indicated that in Year Three security exposure was not a significant predictor of security 
event severity, R
2
 = .01, F(1,37) = 0.19, p > .05.  Results from step 2 of the analysis 
indicated that in Year Three security climate was not a significant predictor of event 
severity over and above security exposure ΔR
2
 = .01, F(1,36) = 0.14, p > .05. 
In order to test for a lagged relationship between security climate and event 
severity, severity of security events from Year Two served as the dependent variable 
while security exposure from Year Two and security climate from Year One served as 
independent variables.   Exploration of the data revealed no univariate or multivariate 
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outliers.  But as before, a number of cases lacked security climate events in Year Two so 
event severity could no be calculated.  In addition, a number of divisions in Year One 
lacked security climate data.  As a result, only 31 divisions were included in the analysis.   
Year Two security exposure was entered in the first step of the regression but was 
not found to be a significant predictor event severity in Year Two, R
2
 = .01, F(1,29) = 
0.14, p > .05.  Likewise, the results from step 2 found that security climate in Year One 
did not significantly add to the prediction of event severity in Year Two over and above 
Year Two security exposure, ΔR
2
 = .01, F(1,28) = 0.03, p > .05. 
Finally, a fourth regression similar to the one above was completed.  Severity of 
security events from Year Three served as the dependent variable and security exposure 
from Year Three and security climate from Year Two served as independent variables in 
order to test for a lagged relationship between security climate and event severity.  No 
univariate or multivariate outliers were identified.  However, event severity could not be 
calculated for some divisions and thus those cases were excluded from the analysis due to 
missing data.  As a result, a total of 33 divisions were included in the analysis.  Results 
from step 1 indicated that Year Three security exposure was not a significant predictor 
event severity in Year Three, R
2
 = .01, F(1,31) = 0.18, p > .05.  Likewise, the results from 
step 2 found that security climate for Year Two was not a significant predictor of event 
severity in Year Three over and above Year Three security exposure, ΔR
2
 = .01, F(1,30) 
= 0.03, p > .05. 
In summary, only one of the four regression analyses showed security climate to 
significantly predict event severity beyond security exposure.  Unfortunately, as with the 
results from H3a, the results from the one significant analysis show that the β for security 
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climate is positive (see Table 6).  This suggests that as security climate increases so does 
the severity of security events, which is opposite of the proposed relationship.  However, 
the presence of reciprocal suppression was again identified.  
Supplemental analyses.  Given the exploratory nature of this study, the decision 
was made to conduct additional supplemental analyses in order to attempt to shed further 
light on the security climate-security performance relationship.  The first two sets of 
supplemental analyses sought to further explore the security climate – event frequency 
relationship proposed in H3a by breaking the original dependent variable of event 
frequency into two separate frequency metrics.  Specifically, measures of frequency of 
self-reported events (those events that were reported to the organization by one or more 
of the individuals responsible for the event) and frequency of non-self-reported events 
(those events discovered by the organization in a way other than self-reporting) were 
created.  In both cases, these frequency metrics were standardized on the basis of division 
size using the same process used to standardize overall event frequency.   
The second two sets of supplemental analyses sought to further explore the 
security climate – event severity relationship proposed in H3b.  To do this, two new 
dependent variables were created.  The first, frequency of reportable events, was 
calculated by grouping and tallying all of the reportable (i.e. IMI1-IMI4) events in a 
division and standardizing based on division size.  The second, frequency of sub-
reportable events, consisted of a tally of each division’s sub-reportable events and again 
standardizing the totals based on division size. 
Using these four new dependent variables, four sets of four regression analyses 
were run using the same pattern employed to test H3a and H3b.  Results from the
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supplemental analyses using the dependent variable of frequency of self-reporting events 
(hereafter, simply self-reporting) are discussed first.  This will be followed by discussion 
of results using frequency of non-self-reporting events (non-self-reporting), followed by 
frequency of reportable events (reportable events), and finally frequency of sub-
reportable events (sub-reportable events). 
The first regression analysis conducted to explore the security climate – self-
reporting relationship included only data from Year Two.  Exploration of these variables 
for missing data, univariate outliers, and multivariate outliers resulted in regression 
analysis with a total of 46 divisions.  In order to control for division security exposure, 
that variable was entered first into the regression equation and was found to be a 
significant predictor of self-reporting, R
2
 = .36, F(1,44) = 24.98, p < .05.  In the second 
step, security climate was entered into the regression equation.  Results indicated that in 
Year Two security climate failed to predict self-reporting over and above security 
exposure, ΔR
2
 = .01, F(1,43) = 0.50, p > .05. 
A second regression analysis, identical to the one above except that Year Three 
data was used in place of data from Year Two, was then conducted.  One case was 
deleted as a univariate outlier resulting in a regression analysis with a total of 50 
divisions.  Division security exposure was entered first into the regression equation and 
was found to be a significant predictor of self-reporting, R
2
 = .09, F(1,48) = 4.50, p < .05.  
Security climate was then entered in the second step.  Results indicated that in Year 
Three security climate was not a significant predictor of self-reporting over and above 
security exposure ΔR
2
 = .06, F(1,47) = 3.27, p > .05. 
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In order to test for a lagged relationship between security climate and self-
reporting, a third regression analysis was conducted with a combination of data from 
Year One and Year Two.  Self-reporting from Year Two served as the dependent variable 
while security exposure from Year Two and security climate from Year One served as 
independent variables.  Due to the lack of Year One security climate data for a number of 
cases, only 39 divisions were included in the analysis.  Year Two security exposure was 
entered in the first step and was found to be a significant predictor of self-reporting in 
Year Two, R
2
 = .23, F(1,37) = 10.99, p < .05.  In the second step, security climate for 
Year One was entered.  Results indicated that security climate for Year One was not a 
significant predictor of self-reporting in Year Two over and above Year Two security 
exposure, ΔR
2
 = .01, F(1,36) = 0.17, p > .05. 
A fourth and final regression similar to the one above was completed using data 
from Year Two and Year Three.  Because of organizational restructuring between Year 
Two and Year Three, a total of 42 divisions were included in the analysis.  After step 1, 
security exposure in Year Three was found to not be a significant predictor self-reporting 
in Year Three, R
2
 = .09, F(1,40) = 3.91, p > .05.  In addition, results from step 2 indicated 
that security climate for Year Two was not a significant predictor of self-reporting in 
Year Three over and above Year Three security exposure, ΔR
2
 = .04, F(1,39) = 1.72, p > 
.05. 
When reviewing the results from the four regression analyses (see Table 7), there 
was no support for a relationship between security climate and self-reporting.  
Specifically, none of the regression analyses found security climate to be a significant 
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predictor of self-reporting over and above security exposure.  However, results from Year 
Three and the second one-year lag did approach significance.   
The supplemental analyses exploring the relationship between security climate 
and non-self-reporting began with a regression using data from Year Two.  After deletion 
of two cases found to be univariate outliers, the final regression analysis was conducted 
on a total of 45 divisions.  In order to control for division security exposure, that variable 
was entered first into the regression equation and was found to be a significant predictor 
of non-self-reporting, R
2
 = .25, F(1,43) = 14.14, p < .05.  In the second step, security 
climate was entered into the regression equation.  Results indicated that in Year Two 
security climate did predict non-self-reporting over and above security exposure, ΔR
2
 = 
.09, F(1,42) = 5.88, p < .05. 
A second regression analysis, identical to the one above except that Year Three 
data was then run.  After deleting cases found to be univariate outliers, a total of 49 cases 
were included in the analysis.  Division security exposure was entered first into the 
regression equation and was found to be a significant predictor of non-self-reporting, R
2
 = 
.10, F(1,47) = 5.40, p < .05.  Security climate was then entered in the second step.  
Results indicated that in Year Three security climate was not a significant predictor of 
non-self-reporting over and above security exposure ΔR
2
 = .02, F(1,46) = 0.5, p > .05. 
To test for a lagged relationship between security climate and event frequency, a 
third regression analysis was conducted using a combination of data from Year One and 
Year Two.  Non-self-reporting from Year Two served as the dependent variable while 
security exposure from Year Two and security climate from Year One served as 
independent variables.  Due to the lack of Year One security climate data for a number of 
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cases, as well as the existence of two cases found to be univariate outliers, only 37 
divisions were included in the analysis.   
Year Two security exposure was entered in the first step and was found to be a 
significant predictor non-self-reporting in Year Two, R
2
 = .21, F(1,35) = 9.15, p < .05.  In 
the second step, security climate for Year One was entered.  Results indicated that 
security climate for Year One was a significant predictor of non-self-reporting in Year 
Two over and above Year Two security exposure, ΔR
2
 = .14, F(1,34) = 7.18, p < .05. 
Finally, a fourth regression similar to the one above was completed to again test 
for a lagged relationship between security climate and non-self-reporting.  Data from 
Year Two and Year Three were combined such that non-self-reporting from Year Three 
served as the dependent variable and security exposure from Year Three and security 
climate from Year Two served as independent variables.  Because of organizational 
restructuring between Year Two and Year Three, some divisions which existed in Year 
Two no longer existed in Year Three.  Thus those divisions were deleted listwise due to 
missing data.  In addition, one case was deleted because it was found to be a univariate 
outlier.  As a result, a total of 41 divisions were included in the analysis.  After step 1, 
security exposure in Year Three was found to be a significant predictor non-self-reporting 
in Year Three, R
2
 = .11, F(1,39) = 4.93, p < .05.  In addition, results from step 2 indicated 
that security climate for Year Two was a significant predictor of non-self-reporting in 
Year Three over and above Year Three security exposure, ΔR
2
 = .18, F(1,38) = 9.48, p < 
.05. 
Three of the four analyses found security climate to be a significant predictor of 
non-self-reporting behavior over and above security exposure.  However, these results are 
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once again revealed to be problematic when reviewing Table 8.  While no relationship 
between climate and non-self-reporting was formally hypothesized, logic would suggest 
that the relationship would be negative because the organization requires employees to 
self-report security incidents that they are involved in.  Therefore, failing to do so 
essentially constitutes a violation of security procedure in addition to the original actions 
that caused the event.  But the security climate βs were again positive which suggests that 
as security climate increases so does non-self-reporting.  As before, presence of 
reciprocal suppression was detected in the results of all three significant analyses. 
The supplemental analysis conducted to explore the relationship between security 
climate and reportable events began by running a regression analysis employing data 
from Year Two.  One case was deleted due to missing data and as a result the final 
regression analysis was conducted on a total of 47 divisions.   
In order to control for division security exposure, that variable was entered first 
into the regression equation.  The results indicated that security exposure in Year Two 
was a significant predictor of reportable events, R
2
 = .12, F(1,45) = 6.20, p < .05.  In the 
second step, security climate was entered into the regression equation.  Results indicated 
that in Year Two security climate failed to predict reportable events over and above 
security exposure, ΔR
2
 = .04, F(1,44) = 2.07, p > .05. 
A second regression analysis was then run using data from Year Three.   One case 
was deleted after it was found to be a univariate outlier.  As a result, the final regression 
analysis was conducted on a total of 50 divisions.  Division security exposure was 
entered first into the regression equation.  Results indicated that it was a significant 
predictor of reportable events, R
2
 = .16, F(1,48) = 9.05, p < .05.  Security climate was
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then entered in the second step but the results suggested that it was not a significant 
predictor of reportable events over and above security exposure ΔR
2
 = .02, F(1,47) = 
1.17, p > .05. 
In order to test for a lagged relationship between security climate and reportable 
events, reportable events from Year Two served as the dependent variable while security 
exposure from Year Two and security climate from Year One served as independent 
variables.  Due to the lack of security climate data for Year One cases, only 39 divisions 
were included in the analysis.  Year Two security exposure was entered in the first step 
but was not found to be a significant predictor of reportable events in Year Two, R
2
 = .04, 
F(1,37) = 1.51, p > .05.  In the second step, security climate for Year One was entered.  
Results indicated that security climate for Year One was not a significant predictor of 
reportable events in Year Two over and above Year Two security exposure, ΔR
2
 = .03, 
F(1,36) = 1.05, p > .05. 
Finally, a fourth regression similar to the one above was completed using a 
combination of data from Year Two and Year Three.  Because of organizational 
restructuring between Year Two and Year Three, some divisions which existed in Year 
Two no longer existed in Year Three.  Thus those divisions, along with one case found to 
be a univariate outlier, were deleted.  As a result, a total of 41 divisions were included in 
the analysis.  After step 1, security exposure in Year Three was found to be a significant 
predictor of reportable events in Year Three, R
2
 = .14, F(1,39) = 6.30, p < .05.  However, 
results from step 2 indicated that security climate for Year Two was not a significant 
predictor of reportable events in Year Three over and above Year Three security 
exposure, ΔR
2
 = .08, F(1,38) = 3.77, p > .05. 
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The results from these four regression analyses (see Table 9), provide no support 
for a relationship between security climate and reportable events.  None of the analyses 
found security climate to be a significant predictor of reportable events over and above 
what was predicted by security exposure.  However, results from the second lagged 
analysis did approach significant (p = .06) and the β was in the expected direction. 
The final set of supplemental analyses was meant to explore any potential 
relationship between security climate and sub-reportable events.  Exploration of data 
from Year Two revealed one division with missing data which was excluded.  This left a 
total of 47 cases for inclusion in the regression analysis  Similar to the previous analyses,  
division security exposure was entered in the first step of the regression equation and was 
found to be a significant predictor of sub-reportable events, R
2
 = .33, F(1,45) = 21.89, p < 
.05.  When entered in the second step, security climate was found to not be a significant 
predictor of sub-reportable events over and above security exposure in Year Two, ΔR
2
 = 
.00, F(1,44) = 0.03, p > .05. 
The above process was repeated for data from Year Three.  Exploration of data 
from Year Three found one division to be a univariate outlier and it was deleted.  As a 
result, the final regression analysis was conducted on a total of 50 divisions.  As was the 
case above, division security exposure entered in the first step was determined to be a 
significant predictor of sub-reportable events, R
2
 = .09, F(1,48) = 4.78, p < .05.  
Likewise, results from the second step of the analysis indicated that security climate for 
Year Three was a significant predictor of sub-reportable events over and above security 
exposure, ΔR
2
 = .09, F(1,47) = 5.06, p < .05. 
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In order to test for a lagged relationship between security climate and sub-
reportable events, a third regression analysis was conducted.  Sub-reportable events from 
Year Two served as the dependent variable while security exposure from Year Two and 
security climate from Year One served as independent variables.  None of the divisions 
contained variables that could be identified as either univariate or multivariate outliers.  
However, the lack of Year One security climate data resulted in sample size of only 39 
divisions for this analysis.  Year Two security exposure was entered in the first step and 
was a significant predictor of sub-reportable events in Year Two, R
2
 = .20, F(1,37) = 
9.35, p < .05.  Security climate for Year One was then entered in the second step.  Results 
indicated that security climate for Year One significantly added to the prediction of sub-
reportable events in Year Two over and above Year Two security exposure, ΔR
2
 = .13, 
F(1,36) = 7.06, p < .05. 
Finally, a fourth regression similar to the one above was completed to again test 
for a lagged relationship between security climate and sub-reportable events.  Sub-
reportable events from Year Three served as the dependent variable and security 
exposure from Year Three and security climate from Year Two served as independent 
variables.  No univariate or multivariate outliers were identified.  As before, some 
divisions which existed in Year Two no longer existed in Year Three.  As a result, a total 
of 42 divisions were included in the analysis.  Security exposure from Year Three was 
entered into the first step of the regression and the results indicated that it was a 
significant predictor of sub-reportable events in Year Three, R
2
 = .09, F(1,40) = 4.09, p < 
.05.  Security climate for Year Two was then entered in the second step and was found 
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not to be a significant predictor of sub-reportable events in Year Three over and above 
Year Three security exposure, ΔR
2
 = .03, F(1,39) = 1.24, p > .05. 
While two of the four analyses were significant, the results must once again be 
interpreted within the context of findings shown in Table 10 on the next page.  In both 
cases the β for security climate was positive which is opposite of what might be logically 
assumed.  And as before, reciprocal suppression was identified in both sets of results. 
Ultimately a lack of consistent significant results, and the presence of reciprocal 
suppression whenever significance was found, in both the hypothesized and supplemental 
analyses make it impossible to suggest support for a security climate – security 
performance relationship in the proposed form.  However, an alternative way to utilize 
these results will be addressed in the discussion section which follows. 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Experts in the field of security have begun contemplating organizational 
characteristics such as climate and culture as potential factors that may contribute to 
security events within organizations.  Despite this interest, these ideas have received very 
little follow-up in the form of empirical research.  In light of the limited amount of work 
on the topic, the current study sought to conduct an exploratory investigation of security 
climate.  To do so, a number of steps were completed.   
First, a conceptualization of the security climate construct had to be developed.  
To that end, relevant literature from fields related to security was reviewed in order to 
identify potential dimensions of security climate.  This literature review lead directly to 
Hypotheses 1a-1c which proposed three separate dimensions of security climate.  The 
analyses provided support for the validity of all three dimensions.  The study then sought 
to confirm the emergent nature of the construct in order to establish that security climate 
was definable at the unit level of measurement.  For that reason, Hypothesis 2a proposed 
that security climate would be shared at the division level and Hypothesis 2b proposed 
that division security climate would be related to division security exposure.  Both H2a 
and H2b were supported, which suggests that security climate is an emergent 
phenomenon.  The final aim of the study was to determine what impact, if any, security 
climate has on security performance.  Therefore, Hypotheses 3a and 3b were put forth 
positing that security climate would be negatively related to frequency of security events 
and severity of security events, respectively.  Analyses revealed the presence of 
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reciprocal suppression, so no conclusions could be drawn regarding the climate-
performance relationships proposed in H3a and H3b.  However, an examination of zero 
order correlations did reveal a few significant relationships between security climate and 
the various security performance metrics.  But these significant findings were limited and 
not in the predicted direction.   
A brief review of all the results from the study, as well as a more in depth 
discussion of conclusions drawn in that context, are presented in the first three sections.  
Then the theoretical and practical implications of the study findings are examined.  
Thereafter, limitations of the study and directions for future research are discussed.  The 
last section concludes with a few final thoughts regarding the study as a whole.   
Development of Climate for Security 
In order to investigate the concept of security climate, the construct had to be 
operationalized in a meaningful way.  As such, three security climate dimensions were 
proposed in Hypotheses 1a-1c, all of which were supported by the results from the 
sorting task.  These findings allow for a number of important conclusions regarding the 
structure of security climate.  
First, the findings suggest that security climate can be viewed as multi-
dimensional.  This conclusion is important because it is in line with the traditional view 
that organizational climate is a multi-dimensional construct (e.g., Campbell et al., 1970).  
Without question, this alone does not prove the existence of security climate.  However, 
if a multi-dimensional structure was not supported, one possible interpretation of the 
findings might have been that the construct being investigated was not a type of climate.   
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While evidence of the multi-dimensional nature of the construct is important, the 
findings allow for a more specific – and practical – conclusion regarding security climate.  
Specifically, support for Hypotheses 1a-1c make it possible to conclude that security 
climate can be operationally defined as employees’ perceptions of management support 
for security (H1a), co-worker support for security (H1b), and security policies and 
procedures (H1c).  The importance of this conclusion for the conceptual development of 
security climate cannot be overstated.  Establishing a sound operational definition is 
critical because security climate is an example of a psychological construct (also known 
as a psychological attribute or psychological trait); which means it is a theoretical 
concept that cannot be directly observed or measured.  In fact, the existence of any 
psychological construct (including personality characteristics, emotions, and 
organizational climate) can only be deduced indirectly by quantifying observable 
phenomena, known as manifest variables, which are thought to occur as a result of some 
hypothesized psychological construct.  In theory, measuring one or more manifest 
variables (such as physical characteristics, physiological responses, or specific behaviors) 
displayed by a subject can be used to gauge the level of a psychological construct present 
in that subject.  However, this idea is only tenable if there is a real relationship between 
the existence of a psychological construct and the occurrence of a manifest variable.  And 
while no assessment of a manifest variable will ever be a perfect proxy for the assessment 
of a psychological construct, a good operational definition can help to increase the 
congruence between the two.   
As an example, consider research similar to the current study which employs 
survey methodology to investigate a psychological construct.  When using survey 
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techniques, each item can be viewed as a stimulus and each item response can be viewed 
as a discrete sample of behavior that can serve as a manifest variable.  In this context, the 
level of congruence between the psychological construct and a particular manifest 
variable is dependent on the stimulus item that elicited the observed behavior.  If the item 
taps content that is relevant to the psychological construct, the resulting manifest variable 
will have a high level of congruence with the construct.  If the item addresses content that 
is not relevant to the psychological construct, congruence between the manifest variable 
and the construct will be low.  The importance of a good operational definition is that it 
specifically outlines the content area believed to be relevant to the psychological 
construct.  This information can then be used to create items which will elicit manifest 
variables that are congruent with the psychological construct.  As a result of this 
congruence, the manifest variables (i.e., the item responses) can serve as an indirect 
measure of the psychological construct. 
As has been discussed, the current study relied on archival data so the 
development of new items was not possible.  However, the operational definition of 
security climate was used to select existing items for inclusion in the security climate 
measure.  While the resulting scale did have shortcomings (only three items were selected 
and only two of the three proposed dimensions were represented by those items), the item 
selection process did produce a measure with a stable factor structure which demonstrates 
evidence of reliability as well as discriminant validity (Campbell & Fiske, 1959).  These 
findings provided support for using the measure to address the two remaining goals of the 
study, testing the emergent nature of security climate and investigating possible 
antecedents of the concept. 
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Emergence of Security Climate 
The second goal of the study was to determine if security climate is an emergent 
phenomenon, meaning that it “originates in the cognition, affect, behaviors or other 
characteristics of individuals, is amplified by their interaction, and manifests as a higher 
level, collective phenomenon” (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000, p. 55).  In other words, 
security climate can be called an emergent phenomenon if perceptions regarding security 
are shared at the group level.  To that end, H2a proposed that shared perceptions 
regarding security would exist within divisions (which served as the group level of 
measurement in this study).  Using individuals’ responses on the security climate 
measure, three separate indices of consensus (rwg, ICC1, and ICC2) were calculated to 
assess the extent of agreement among employees within the same division.  In addition, a 
one-way analysis of variance was calculated to determine if security perceptions would 
differ among divisions.   
Results from these analyses, which were repeated for each of the three years of 
available data, support the assertion of Hypothesis 2a that individual employees’ 
perceptions regarding security tend to be shared by others within the same division.  
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that security climate is an emergent phenomenon.  In 
addition, the ANOVA results suggest that perceptions of security varied among divisions.  
Because shared perceptions of security exist at the division level and these shared 
perceptions differ among divisions, the findings suggest that security climate may emerge 
at the division level of the organization.  However, these results do not explain why the 
emergence of security climate occurs at the division level. 
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According to Zohar (2000), if climate exists at the group level then sources of 
climate perceptions should also be at the group level.  With that in mind, Hypothesis 2b 
posited that the security climate within a division would be related to the security 
exposure of that division.  The hypothesis was supported by significant negative 
correlations between division security climate and division security exposure.  These 
results indicate that higher (i.e. more positive) security climate tends to emerge in 
divisions with low security exposure and lower (i.e. more negative) security climate tends 
to emerge in divisions with high security exposure.   
These findings are important to the goals of this study for a number of reasons.  
First of all, the results suggest that a portion of the divisional differences in security 
climate can be explained by the variance in division security exposure.  In addition, it has 
been argued (e.g., Crocker & Algina, 1986) that the development of novel psychological 
constructs such as security climate must go beyond the establishment of an operational 
definition by evaluating the construct through quantitative comparisons with other similar 
variables.  Correlating division security climate with division security exposure in the 
current study was a first attempt at such an evaluation.  And the significant results help to 
further validate the climate construct. 
The results supporting both H2a and H2b provide important incremental steps on 
the path to understanding security climate.  First, these results demonstrate that shared 
perceptions regarding security do develop among employees within a division.  This 
confirms that security climate does emerge as a group level variable.  In addition, 
evidence suggests that security climate varies across divisions and these differences are 
related in a meaningful way to other measurable security characteristics of the division 
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(in this case, division security exposure).  In light of these findings, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that security climate exists as a definable construct.   
Outcomes of Security Climate 
A central assumption underlying much of the research on organizational climate 
seems to be the notion that the construct influences organizational performance.  
Schneider (1975) postulated that the general mechanism driving the climate-performance 
relationship is the human desire for an ordered environment to guide an individual’s 
understanding of the behaviors deemed appropriate by the group to which they belong.  
In other words, individuals in a group attempt to adjust their behavior to be consistent 
with the common understanding (i.e. shared perceptions) of what is expected from them.  
If this common understanding is positive (i.e. in line with the goals of the organization) 
the resulting behaviors should lead to performance improvement within the group.  
Likewise, if the common understanding is negative (i.e. counter to the goals of the 
organization) the resulting behaviors might be detrimental to the group’s performance.   
On the basis of this logic, the final goal of the study was to investigate the 
relationship between division security climate and division security performance.  To that 
end Hypothesis 3a proposed that a division’s security climate would be negatively related 
to the frequency of security events within the division, and Hypothesis 3b proposed that a 
division’s security climate would be negatively related to the severity of security events 
within a division.  However, neither hypothesis could be accurately evaluated due to the 
presence of reciprocal suppression (which occurs when each of the predictor variables in 
a regression equation simultaneously exert a suppression effect on the other predictor 
variables in the equation).  Unlike other suppression situations where the predictor 
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variable(s) exerting a suppression effect can be identified and removed, in the reciprocal 
form all the predictors act as suppressor variables.  As a result, the only reliable estimate 
of the effect size between a particular predictor and the criterion requires eliminating all 
other predictors from the analysis to remove the effect of suppression.  In the current 
study, this meant relying on the zero order correlations between security climate and the 
two security performance metrics.   
Tests of H3a produced four validity coefficients between security climate and 
event frequency.  Of the four, only the correlation between Year One climate and Year 
Two frequency was significant (r = .26, p < .05, N = 39).  Results from H3b produced 
four validity coefficients between security climate and event severity.  The only 
significant result was the correlation between Year Two climate and Year Two severity (r 
= .38, p < .05, N = 38).  To extend this discussion, briefly consider the significant validity 
coefficients from the sixteen supplemental regression analyses that were conducted.  
When frequency of self-reported events served as the criterion, the correlation between 
climate in Year Two and self-reporting in Year Three (r = -.28, p < .05, N = 42) was the 
only significant finding.  The four analyses that used frequency of non-self-reported 
behavior as the criterion found significant correlations for both of the one year lagged 
analyses (r = .31, p < .05, N = 37 and r = .32, p < .05, N = 41 for the Y1/Y2 and Y2/Y3 
lags respectively) but neither of the within year analyses were significant.  When 
reportable events served as the criterion, the correlation between Year Two security 
climate and Year Three reportable events was significant (r = -.37, p < .05, N = 41).  
Finally, when the criterion was sub-reportable events, the only significant result was the 
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correlation between Year One climate and Year Two sub-reportable events (r = .30, p < 
.05, N = 39). 
Overall, the analyses conducted to test H3a and H3b combined with the results 
from the supplemental analyses produced twenty-four zero order correlations between 
security climate and the criterion measures.  A total of seven of these correlations (about 
30%) were significant.  Clearly, these results do not provide overwhelming support for 
the existence of a security climate – security performance relationship.  But despite these 
somewhat disappointing findings, the analyses did reveal some interesting patterns in the 
results that could be useful in the effort to better understanding security climate. 
One such pattern points to a counterintuitive relationship between security climate 
and security performance.  Originally a positive relationship between the constructs was 
proposed where increases in security climate (climate gets stronger) would be 
accompanied by increases in security performance (frequency of events goes down or 
average event severity decreases).  But the significant correlations between security 
climate and the two original metrics of security performance seem to suggest that the 
relationship is in the opposite direction, as security climate increases so does both event 
frequency and event severity (increases in these criterion measures were viewed as an 
indication of decreasing security performance).   
In truth, a number of explanations could be put forth to account for these 
counterintuitive results.  One possible explanation comes from work done in the field of 
safety climate by Mearns and colleagues (Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & Fleming, 1998).  
These authors postulated that in some situations a strong safety climate might create a 
sense of complacency among employees which might lead to increased safety problems.  
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While this notion runs counter to the hypotheses put forth in the current study, and 
perhaps the core assumptions regarding the climate – performance relationship laid out 
by Schneider (1975), it does provide a potential explanation for the peculiar findings.   
However, there are other possible explanations for these results that do not 
conflict with the initial expectations regarding the direction of a security climate – 
security performance relationship.  For example, it is possible that an increase in security 
climate could be associated with an increase in employee vigilance, rather than 
complacency, regarding security.  Given the fact that senior security managers within the 
organization have acknowledged that security events are likely underreported, increased 
vigilance among employees could result in better detection of security events and/or 
better compliance with the rules requiring employees to report potential events when they 
are discovered.  This could lead to an increase in the number, and potentially the average 
severity, of events that get reported even if there is no change in the actual number of 
events that occur.  As a result, it might initially appear as if stronger security climate was 
related to weaker security performance.  However, this initial view would be misleading 
because the increased employee vigilance – resulting from an increase in security climate 
– actually leads to a more accurate (although somewhat higher) assessment of the true 
level of security event frequency and severity.  In the end, this explanation of the 
counterintuitive results is both plausible and not in direct conflict with the initial 
expectations regarding the direction of a security climate – security performance 
relationship.   
Unfortunately, it is possible to poke holes in both of these potential post-hoc 
explanations when they are viewed within the context of the significant correlations 
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attained from the supplemental analyses.  Consider, for example, what occurred when the 
original criterion of event frequency was divided into two separate criterion measures 
(frequency of self-reported events and frequency of non-self-reported events).  While 
only three significant zero order correlations were found, they showed that stronger 
security climate was associated with a decrease in the frequency of self-reported events 
but an increase in non-self-reported events.  If a strong climate were to lead to employee 
complacency, as posited by Mearns et al. (1998), one would expect a positive correlation 
between security climate and frequency of non-self-reported events rather than the 
negative correlation that was found.  Likewise, when the other original criterion (average 
event severity) was divided into two separate measures the significant correlations 
showed that stronger security climate was associated with a decrease in the frequency of 
reportable events (those ranked as IMI1-IMI4 according to Table 2) but an increase in the 
frequency of sub-reportable events.  If strong security climate leads to better employee 
vigilance (as discussed above) one would expect a positive correlation between security 
climate and frequency of reportable events rather than the negative correlation that 
resulted.  In conclusion, any attempt to offer post-hoc explanations for results is rightly 
viewed as speculation.  The surprising results might just as likely be explained by a more 
complex relationship between variables, the use of a non-normal sample that doesn’t 
reflect the overall population, or some other factor.   
Theoretical Implications 
There are important theoretical implications to consider as a result of the current 
project.  First, the study proposes and develops the construct of security climate which is 
a novel application of the general organizational climate concept.  In doing so, this work 
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also addresses the somewhat underserved question of situational factors that might lead to 
security related events.  Finally, the study argues for the existence of a category of 
workplace behaviors (i.e., security behaviors) that is distinct from similar types of 
workplace behaviors that are already well established in the organizational science 
research.  Each of these implications will be discussed in greater detail below. 
The primary goal of this project was to explore the concept of security climate.  
Admittedly, some research has explored the general climate construct in relation to 
specific security events such as theft (Levine & Jackson, 2002).  However, this study is 
one of the first known to propose and investigate a novel application of climate which is 
focused on the broader strategic organizational outcome of security.  Therefore, this 
effort is theoretically important because it expands the extant field of organizational 
climate research.   
In addition to the theoretical implications associated with developing the 
construct, the study also has implications for research on topics such as theft.  
Specifically, it addresses a call made almost two decades ago (Trevino & Youngblood, 
1990) for more investigation of the role situational variables play in the occurrence of 
such events.  Before that time, a great deal of attention had been paid to individual level 
variables such as age (Hollinger, 1986), gender (Mangione & Quinn, 1975), personality 
(Salgado, 2002), or tenure (Duffy, Ganster, & Shaw, 1998) despite the fact that it is 
widely accepted that behaviors result from the interaction of both situational and 
individual factors.  While subsequent research has explored situational variables like 
organizational justice in relation to behaviors such as theft (e.g., Greenberg, 1990), the 
current study bolsters these efforts by providing some evidence that the situational 
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variable of security climate may be another important factor which contributes to the 
occurrence of security related events. 
In addition, the current study directly addresses the relationship between security 
behaviors and the concepts of CWBs and safety behaviors.  Admittedly there are 
similarities, and in some cases an overlap, between security behaviors and the other two 
concepts.  However, the case was made that security behaviors should be viewed as a 
distinct category of workplace behaviors.  This argument is theoretically important 
because it suggests that the existing nomological network (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) 
covering workplace behaviors should be expanded to include a unique category covering 
security behaviors which would be operationalized through the three separate dimensions 
of perpetrator (organizational insider, outsider, or some combination of the two), target (a 
continuum from organizational assets to individual assets), and intention (behaviors can 
range from non-nefarious error to malicious intent).   
Practical Implications 
 In addition to the theoretical implications above, the study suggests a number of 
practical implications as well.  For example, the system for categorizing security events 
(perpetrator, target, and intention) proposed earlier might be a useful tool for 
professionals in the security field.  Admittedly, many security conscious organizations 
conduct investigations which gather a wealth of information that could be used to 
categorize events.  But despite the important role of human behavior in security events 
(Pond, 2002), common classification systems used by security practitioners (e.g., the IMI 
system for rating event severity used by the organization in this study) do not address the 
factors that drive those behaviors.  Therefore, incorporating the proposed classification 
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system into existing security investigations may help security professionals begin to 
identify not only how certain types of security events occur, but also why they occur. 
 A second practical implication from the study deals with recommendations from 
groups such as the IAEA (e.g., IAEA, 2001; IAEA, 2002; IAEA, 2003) which advocate 
more focus on organizational factors when establishing security in the nuclear 
environment.  These IAEA recommendations might be justified, but up until now the 
organization has not provided concrete explanations of constructs such as security 
climate.  Furthermore, the validity of these suggestions has not been investigated 
empirically.  Therefore, the results of this study are important because they suggest 
caution for security professionals who hope to utilize security climate in order to improve 
security performance.  Based on the study results, it could be argued that the findings do 
not yet justify dedicating resources to security climate in an applied setting.  This is not to 
say that there is no meaningful security climate – security performance relationship, it 
simply means that at this early stage the true relationship between the two is not clear.  
Therefore, in the nuclear environment (which is high-risk and high-consequence), broad 
statements about the utility of security climate should be tempered until more robust 
conclusions can be made. 
Limitations 
 As with all research, this study contains some limitations that must be 
acknowledged.  First of all, the analyses which used data aggregated at the division level 
(i.e. H2b, H3a and H3b) suffer from a relatively small sample sizes.  Furthermore, the 
sample size was restricted to the number of division within the organization (minus 
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divisions with missing data).  With that in mind, interpretation of the results should be 
done cautiously because estimates of effect size can be unstable when N is low. 
In addition to sample size, some of the measures used in the study also create 
potential limitations.  In the Results section above, I discussed the near-perfect 
correlation between the ratings of security exposure in Year Two and Year Three and the 
possibility that this result was due to the way exposure data was collected (SMEs ratings 
for both years collected at the same time, more than two years after Year Three).  
However, the type of work done in a division does not change much from one year to the 
next so there is reason to believe that exposure wouldn’t change much either.  Likewise, 
the interrater reliability results were acceptable for both years.  Ideally, more objective 
measures of security exposure (e.g., percentage of a division’s employees with 
government security clearances) would have been preferred but were not made available 
by the study organization.  Despite this, the evidence does provide some confidence in 
the exposure measure. 
The measure of security climate also had some limitations.  As mentioned 
previously, the measure contained only three items and only two of the three dimensions 
proposed in H1a-H1b were represented.  Clearly, additional items would have been 
desirable as this would have allowed for more thorough sampling of the content domain 
and possibly improved the reliability of the measure.  Nonetheless, the security climate 
scale did exhibit sound psychometric properties. 
In addition, there are potential limitations associated with the criterion measures 
of security performance.  All of these measures (the two originally proposed and the four 
created for the supplemental analyses) were derived from the Event data set supplied by 
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the organization’s Security Division.  This data set contained information about all of the 
security events that the organization knew about, but it is likely that the data set did not 
include every event that occurred.  There are two factors that may account for this fact.  
First, those security events that occur as a result of malevolent intent, while rare, are 
almost always surreptitious in nature.  That is, those individuals who violate security 
procedures for nefarious purposes (e.g., an espionage agent of a foreign government or an 
employee stealing assets for personal gain) will only succeed in their efforts if they are 
able to avoid detection.  Furthermore, those events that are neither intentional nor 
malevolent may not always be detected.  While employees in the organization have a 
responsibility to report any potential events, doing so can result in punitive action against 
those involved.   
One common alternative to formal event reports, upon which the Event data set in 
the current study is based, is the use of surveys where respondents answer questions 
about their own involvement in activities such as workplace theft or other CWBs (e.g., 
Hollinger, 1986; Slora, 1989).  In theory, this method of data collection will likely 
provide the lowest-bound estimates of event base rates because the truthfulness of 
answers on sensitive topics have been questioned (e.g., Dalton & Metzger, 1992).  For 
example, an elegantly designed study conducted by Wimbush and Dalton (1997) used 
three separate methods to estimate base rates of workplace theft.  The three methods 
utilized by the authors included anonymous surveys, the randomized-response technique 
(RRT), and an unmatched-count technique (UCT).  The results demonstrated that the 
estimates of overall theft rates obtained from the RRT and UCT methods were virtually 
identical (59.2% and 57.9% respectively).  However, participants’ admissions of theft 
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behavior from the survey produced an estimated base rate of 28.2% which was less than 
half that of the other two methods.  The authors suggest that these results might be 
attributed to participants’ perceptions of anonymity in each of the three methods.  Survey 
respondents may question the assertion of anonymity in the survey method.  However, 
data collected using the RRT and UCT methods only have meaning when viewed in 
aggregate so even if individuals’ responses were not anonymous it would be impossible 
to determine whether any single individual participated in workplace theft. 
Because there is no expectation of anonymity in the formal process of event 
reporting within the study organization, it is logical to assume the Event data set might 
underestimate the true number of security events.  Under the current circumstance, it is 
impossible to know how many security events go undiscovered by the organization over 
the course of a year so it is difficult to determine the accuracy of the Event data set.  
However, characteristics of the organization and its workforce exist which are believed to 
minimize this issue.  First, the organization’s work environment is high regulated and 
employees’ activities are closely monitored for possible security violations.  Likewise, 
audits are frequently conducted by the Security Division which can lead to the discovery 
of unreported security violations.  In addition, employees generally take their 
responsibility for self-reporting potential security violations very seriously because when 
an event is not self-reported but is discovered anyway, any punitive action that would 
have been taken against an employee for their involvement can be dramatically increased.  
Furthermore, all employees are required to report possible security violations committed 
by co-workers – which mirrors the use of both self- and peer-reporting of CWBs in 
previous research (e.g., Penney & Spector, 2005) – and individuals can be held 
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accountable for failing to do so.  Ultimately, the data set was the most complete record of 
security events available which is why it was used to derive metrics of security 
performance. 
One final limitation to the study was the fact that demographic information from 
the employee opinion survey was not available for inclusion as study variables due to 
privacy concerns raised by the organization.  Because previous research has found that 
individual difference variables such as age (Hollinger, 1986) and gender (Mangione & 
Quinn, 1975) are correlated to behaviors such as theft and sabotage, the inclusion of such 
demographic variables might have added to the current study.   
Future Research 
 The limited amount of empirical research aimed at investigating security climate 
means that a number of unanswered questions about the construct remain.  In light of 
this, the field seems to have great potential for future research.  One area that seems to 
merit further exploration is the dimensional structure of the construct.  The nature of the 
data used in this study restricted the types of dimensions that could be explored.  But 
considering the wide variety of climate dimensions that have been proposed (e.g., Ostroff 
et al., 2003), additional dimensions of security climate beyond those included here are 
certainly possible.  Therefore, future research should not only attempt to replicate the 
current study results, it should also investigate whether other facets not mentioned in this 
study might be important components of climate for security. 
There are a variety of potential security climate dimension worthy of 
consideration including perceptions of the organization’s security professionals, 
workplace and job demands, and even employees’ perceptions risk.  In fact, risk 
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perceptions have already been explored as a dimension of safety climate.  For example, 
DeJoy (1996) conceptualized employees’ perceptions of risk – what he termed “hazard 
appraisal” – as an important component of climate for safety which lead employees to 
adopt self-protective behaviors such as the use of personal protection equipment.  In 
addition, Weyman et al. (2003) factor analyzed responses from coal miners on an eighty-
three item safety survey.  Results indicated a three-factor structure where “confidence in 
ability to control risk” was one factor.   
But while evidence from the safety field bolsters the claim that the dimension 
may also prove to be an important component of security climate, perceptions of security 
risk may be more complex than perceptions of safety risk.  In terms of safety, the risk is 
usually viewed as a risk to oneself and perhaps to other co-workers (“Will I, or my co-
workers, get hurt doing this job?”).  In contrast, risk in the security context can be viewed 
in multiple ways.  On the one hand, employees’ perceptions may focus on risks to 
themselves or co-workers when their actions cause security events (“Will I get caught 
and be punished for negative security behaviors?”).  On the other hand, employees’ 
perceptions could also focus on the risks faced by the organization (“Is the organization 
really under credible threat?”). In the end, investigation of each of these types of 
employee perceptions will lead to a better understanding of the security climate construct. 
 A related issue that needs additional research attention is the development and 
validation of a measure designed specifically to assess climate for security.  The 
development of measures specific to climate for security would make it easier for future 
researchers attempting to further explore the nature of the concept.  To construct such a 
measure, future research might focus on developing items to assess the three security 
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climate dimensions proposed in the current study.  More specifically, each dimension's 
content domain could serve as a starting point in the process of item development.     
For example, a review of the SME responses that were sorted into the 
management commitment to security category revealed that multiple SMEs had talked 
about the importance of managers modeling good security behavior, providing adequate 
resources to meet security objectives, and communicating regularly with employees 
regarding security matters.  Common themes from the co-worker support for security 
category included the importance of both co-worker attitudes about security (particularly 
the attitudes of well respected co-workers) as well as the willingness of co-workers to 
intervene when they witness poor security behaviors from peers.  Finally, within the 
security policies and procedures category common themes included the importance of 
involving employees in the development of these policies and procedure, avoiding the 
proliferation of confusing and sometimes inconsistent policies and procedures, and 
assuring fairness in the way the organization responds after an incident has occurred.   
 Future efforts to study climate for security might also consider the question of 
generalizability.  The organization at the center of this study is unique for a variety of 
reasons.  For example many of the organization’s employees hold high-level government 
security clearances, the work that they conduct is often sensitive, and the organization has 
a strong security program in place.  While these characteristics combine to create a 
fascinating environment for security research, they also present uncertainty about the 
generalizability of study results.  For example, financial institutions, retail organizations, 
and hospitals all face important security issues but the nature of these issues (such as the 
kinds of adversaries they are confronted with and the threats posed by these adversaries) 
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are likely to vary significantly from those of the organization in this study.  As a result, 
future research might investigate organizational differences in areas such as the way 
security climate develops, the relative importance of different dimensions, and how 
security climate might influence security behaviors.   
Another area for future research is the need for cross-cultural investigations of 
security climate.  As mentioned previously, the IAEA has repeatedly stressed the 
importance of organizational factors at nuclear facilities (e.g., IAEA, 2001; IAEA, 2002; 
IAEA, 2003) around the globe.  Such calls lead to important cross-cultural questions that 
should be addressed.  For example, in the field of nuclear security it has been suggested 
that constructs such as security climate would be most useful if some type of “world 
norms” could be established (R. Lawrence, personal communication, January 28, 2008).  
However, developing international standards for security climate might prove to be 
difficult.  On the one hand, different cultures tend to view the concept of security 
differently (Khripunov, 2005).  In addition, ideas about security could potentially be 
impacted by cultural dynamics such as Hofstede’s (1983) proposition that nations can 
vary on a continuum from individualism (each person is responsible for themselves and 
commitment to the group is secondary) to collectivism (loyalty to the group is expected 
in exchange for the benefits that membership affords).  Therefore, it may be possible that 
while many aspects of security climate are equally relevant in any country, some aspects 
of the construct may need to be tailored to the unique perspectives of a given culture.  As 
a result, cross-cultural differences in the type of security climate that emerges (or in the 
process of emergence itself) ought to be explored.   
                                                                                
101 
 
 The final area for potential future research is to examine how the presence of a 
security climate might affect other types of climates as well as how it might interact with 
other climates and impact organizational outcomes.  According to Ostroff et al. (2003), 
most of the research that examines specific climate types (e.g., safety climate) does so 
while ignoring other types of climate that may also be present at the same time.  
Therefore, it is worth examining how the presence of a security climate might interact 
with other types of climates and these interactions might impact organizational outcomes.   
As suggested recently by Zohar (2008), organizational climate contains multiple 
facets such as ethical climate (Parboteeah & Kapp, 2008), customer service climate 
(Schneider, 1990), and violence climate (Spector, Coulter, Stockwell, & Matz, 2007).  It 
is possible that some of these climates would likely covary because they reflect different 
yet related organizational characteristics.  Based on Zohar’s multi-climate framework, 
security climate may interact with ownership climate, which indicate whether 
organizations encourage workers to commit extra-role activities such as vigilance or 
focus on workers’ compliance on every security regulations (i.e., in-role activity).  Under 
the high security climate and high ownership climate, workers would show extra-role or 
citizenship security behaviors. In contrast, workers would comply with security 
regulations as required when security climate is high and ownership climate is low.   
Another example would be the relationship between security climate and climate 
for innovation.  On the one hand, a strong security climate might lead employees to be 
cautious about widely disseminating sensitive information.  However, innovative 
climates tend to exhibit a free flow of information.  Given that these two perspectives 
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appear to be at odds, it is likely that these climates would affect each other such that a 
strong security climate would hinder a strong innovative climate, or vice versa.   
 It is not overstated to say that the study of security climate is very much in its 
infancy.  Therefore, there is great potential for future research in the field.  While I have 
tried to lay out my vision of important areas needing additional study, there is no doubt 
that there are many other avenues that have not been mentioned.   
Conclusion 
The establishment of good security has been a focus of societies throughout 
history (Johnston, 2006).  To support these efforts within the context of the organization, 
the current study sought to empirically investigate the novel construct of climate for 
security.  In doing so, a number of important milestones in the development of the 
construct were reached.  First, by adapting the generally accepted definition of 
organizational climate to the specific strategic outcome of security it was possible to 
define security climate as a security characteristic of an organization that is manifested in 
employees’ shared perceptions of the organization’s security policies, practices, and 
procedures.  In addition, the construct was further operationalized by identifying three 
dimensions including management support for security, co-worker support for security, 
and perceptions of security policies and procedures.  Furthermore, a basic measure of 
security climate was identified and the emergence of security climate was confirmed.  
Finally, a preliminary exploration of potential relationships between security climate and 
security performance was conducted.  In light of these accomplishments, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the three primary goals of the study (developing the construct, evaluating 
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its emergent nature, and exploring the relationship between security climate and security 
performance) were achieved.   
Admittedly, however, the study did have limitations which put constraints on 
what could be accomplished.  And in some cases, perhaps due to the exploratory nature 
of the study, the results raised almost as many (if not more) questions than they were able 
to answer.  Therefore, it is clear that much more research is needed to further develop and 
refine the construct.  Nevertheless, the findings of the study suggest that security climate 
could be a useful component of an organization’s overall security strategy.   
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Appendix A: Instructions for SME Data Set Sorting Task 
The table beginning on the next page of this document consists of five columns that you 
will use to complete the item sorting task.  Each of the columns contain descriptive 
headers.  An explanation of each of these columns follows. 
 
Column A/Interview Responses – This column consists of a list of responses collected 
during semi-structured interviews with a number of subject matter experts (SMEs) in the 
field of organizational security.   
 
Column B/Management Support –You will use this column to indicate if the responses in 
Column A are exemplars of Perceptions of Management Support for Security.  We define 
management support as employees’ perceptions of the degree to which managers and 
supervisors support, promote, manage and prioritize the importance of organizational 
security. 
 
Column C/Co-Worker Support –You will use this column to indicate if the responses in 
Column A are exemplars of Perceptions of Co-Worker Support for Security.  We define 
co-worker support as employees’ perceptions of the degree to which co-workers and 
peers support, promote, and prioritize the importance of organizational security. 
 
Column D/Policies and Procedures –You will use this column to indicate if the responses 
in Column A are exemplars of Perceptions of Security Policies and Procedures.  We 
define policies and procedures as employees’ perceptions of security policies and 
procedures including such things as relevance, effectiveness, and user-friendliness. 
 
Column E/Not Applicable –You will use this column to indicate if the responses in 
Column A are NOT examples of any of the above categories  
 
PROCEDURE: Please carefully read each of the responses in Column A one at a time.  
After that, decide if the response reflects one of the three categories (as defined above 
and in the column descriptive headers in Columns B, C, and D) and indicate your choice 
by marking an X in the corresponding column.  If you feel that the response is not an 
exemplar of any of the three categories, mark an X on Column E.  Please mark ONLY 
ONE X in each row. 
 
The sorting task begins on the next page. 
